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CASENOTES
The Supreme Court upholds worldwide unitary taxation by the states of multinational
corporate income: Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax Board.' Many
states in the United States have adopted the unitary business concept as a method for
estimating their fair share of the income tax base of a multiju risdictional — multistate or
multinational — enterprise.' For corporate income taxation purposes, the unitary busi-
ness concept considers affiliated groups of firms as a single business divided into purely
formal, separately incorporated subsidiaries for reasons of legal convenience." Relying on
this approach, several states have developed a two-step technique' in order to tax their
fair share of the worldwide unitary income of a multinational enterprise.' First, these
states require combined reporting" of the net income of all the affiliated corporations
' 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983), reh'g denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. October 10, 1983).
See infra notes 350-52 and accompanying text.
3 Note, Multinational Corporations and Income Allocation Under Section 482 of the Internal Revenue
Code, 89 HARI'. L. REV. 1202, 1205 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note, Multinational Corporations]. See
also Dexter, The Unitary Concept in State Income Taxation of Multistate-Mullinalional Businesses, 10 URB.
LAW. 181, 182 - 83 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Dexter, The Unitary Concept]; J. Hellerstein, Recent
Developments in State Tax Apportionment and the Circumscription of Unitary Business, 21 NAT'L. TAXI 487,
487 (1968) [hereinafter cited as J. Hellerstein, Recent Developments]; W. Hellerstein, Stale Income
Taxation of Multi-jurisdictional Corporations and the Supreme Court, 35 NAT'r„ TAX J. 401, 401 - 02 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as W. Hellerstein, Slate Income Taxation]; Keesling, A Current Look at the Combined
Report and Uniformity in Allocation Practices, 42 J. TAx'N. 106, 107 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Keesling,
A Current Look].
4
 See infra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
5
 Multinational firms have been defined as a "cluster of corporations of diverse nationality
joined together by ties of common ownership and responsive to a common management strategy."
Note, Multinational Corporations, supra note 3, at 1202 (quoting Vernon, Economic Sovereignty at Bay, 47
FOREIGN AFT. 110, 114 (1968)). Although the subsidiary corporations in a multinational firm are
legally separate, in fact the parent company, which exercises ultimate managerial authority, tends to
view them as parts of a single global system. Note, Multinational Corporations, supra note 3, at 1202.
The overall success of the entire affiliated group, rather than that of any individual component, is
considered critical. Id.
" A combined report must be distinguished clearly from a consciidated return. Whereas the com-
bined report is not a tax return, the consolidated return is a tax return. Corrigan, Mobil- izing Interstate
Taxation, 13 TAX NOTES 803, 804 n.3 (Oct. 12, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Corrigan, Mobil- izing];
Keesling, A Current Look, supra note 3, at 108. By using a consolidated report, income is not only
computed as a unit, but also taxed as a unit. Keesling, A Current Look, supra note 3, at 108. The
combined report is merely an "informational" return, used to determine the tax liability of a
corporation by reference to the activities of other corporations which are part of a unitary business
with the taxpayer corporation.
Combined reporting is a technique developed by the states to respond to the multi-corporate
structure of modern conglomerates. Id. Originally the states had to deal only with single corporations
consisting of multiple divisions located in various taxing jurisdictions. Id. Thus, the entire unitary
business coincided with a single taxpayer. id. Corporations, however, evolved their structure into a
constellation of subsidiary and affiliated corporations under the leadership and control of a parent
holding company. Id. Each separate corporation is technically a separate taxpayer, but the unitary
business consists of all the subsidiaries and affiliates together. Id. If apportionment of income were
limited to the component parts of a single-corporate unitary business, its purpose might be easily
frustrated by organizing the functional or regional divisions of a business into separate subsidiary or
affiliated corporations. Id. This risk is eliminated by requiring commonly owned or controlled
corporations constituting a unitary business to file a combined report detailing the profits or losses and
the property, payroll, and sales factor for each related corporation. Id. All intercompany items and
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composing a multinational firm, if any one of the components of the firm does business
within the state.' Second, the states apportion such combined taxable income among the
various jurisdictions where the firm does business according to an index of the real
economic contribution of each component corporation to the production of the overall
profits of the entire group." The applicable index is normally determined by a formula
that takes into account the geographical distribution of the factors of production — labor
and capital — and of sales." This technique is generally referred to as worldwide com-
bined formula apportionment. The unitary business concept and formula apportionment
disregard formal corporate distinctions and look at the underlying economic realities of it
multijurisdictional enterprise.
Two fundamental purposes justify the adoption of worldwide unitary taxation. On
the one hand, a state's worldwide unitary treatment of multijurisdictional firms prevents
arbitrary income shifting on the part of the latter from jurisdictions with high tax burdens
to others with more favorable income taxation.'" On the other hand, formula apportion-
ment allows the states to allocate taxable income more fairly when separate accounting
cannot satisfactorily isolate the profits attributable to particular component parts of a
multijurisdictional conglomerate. ''
transactions, including intra - unitary business dividends, must be eliminated to avoid double counting
of a portion of gross income. Id. Combined unitary income is apportioned to the taxing jurisdiction by
application of the combined apportionment formula to the combined net income of the entire multicor-
porate enterprise. Id. at 107.
Keesling, A Current Look, supra note 3, at 108.
Note, Multinational Corporations, supra note 3, at 1206 -07. The alternative approach available to
state tax authorities for determining their jurisdiction's fair share of the income tax base created by a
multi-jurisdictional enterprise is the separate accounting approach, which regards each affiliated
corporation as a separate and independent entity. Id. at 1205. If the separate accounting approach is
used, taxable income is allocated to the separate corporate entity to which it formally belongs. Id.
Such allocation, however, is subject to transfer price review and eventual adjustment of intercom-
pany transactions so as to make them conform to the results of bargaining which would have been
negotiated between unrelated parties, dealing at arm's length in similar goods and services and in
similar circumstances. Id. See generally Musgrave, International Tax Base Division and the Multinational
Corporations, 27 Pus. FIN. 394 (1972).
I) See infra note 20 and accompanying text. The most widely used apportionment formula is the
so-called "three factor formula," which takes into account property, payroll and sales, and attributes
equal weight to each factor. Government Accounting Office, Key Issues Affecting State Taxation of
Multyurisdictional Corporate Income Need Resolving, 17 TAx NOTES 159, 160 (Julj, 12, 1982). Sonie
jurisdictions take into account only one or two of these factors or incorporate entirely different
factors in their formula. Id. Different jurisdictions attribute different weight to different factors. Id.
Apportionment formulas often change for the same jurisdiction depending on the type of industry
involved and, sometimes, depending on the particular circumstances of a specific taxpayer firm.
1 " Note, Multinational Corporations, supra note 3, at 1203. Income shifting is possible because
multinational parents and subsidiaries, unlike truly separate corporations dealing at arm's length, are
largely free from market constraints in setting transfer prices for intercompany transactions in goods
and services within the affiliated group. Id. The level of transfer prices has a direct effect on the
amount of net income of each component corporation and on the distribution of overall profits
within the group. Id. The amount of each component's income liability in the states or nations where
it operates may therefore be easily manipulated. Id.
" Id. at 1215. Separate accounting may be inappropriate to allocate the tax base because
economic interrelations among affiliated corporations may give rise to a variety of synergistic effects,
which alter the costs and benefits of transacting intercompany business. Id. Whenever commonly
controlled entities directly contribute either horizontally or vertically to a single production-
distribution cycle, opportunities for cost savings through economies of scale and reduced transaction
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California was the lit's( state to adopt the unitary approach to taxation of corporate
income and has consistently expanded and improved application of this approach to both
multistate and multinational affiliated groups of corporations. 12
 California's treatment of
a multinational firm doing business within the state was at issue in Container Corporation o/
America v. Franchise Tax Board," where the taxpayer claimed that the California statute
violated the due process and commerce clauses of the United States Constitution. In
deciding this case, the United States Supreme Court, for the first time, upheld a state's
worldwide unitary taxation of the combined income of a multinational enterprise through
formula apportionment."
California imposes a corporate franchise income tax." The California statute em-
ploys the unitary business principle and formula apportionment" in applying the tax to
corporations doing business both within and without the state," When a multijurisdic-
tional corporation has income from business activity which is taxable both within and
without the state, the California statute determines the share of the tax base attributable
to the state." The statute defines apportionable income as business income' and pro-
costs may result. See generally F.M. Sm•tER, INDUSTRIAL. MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFOR-
MANCE: 72-103 (1970); Musgrave, supra note 8, at 403. Even whete no direct transfers are made,
centralized management may result in increased efficiency and lower costs of operation. See Keesling
& Warren, The Unitary Concept in the Allocation of Income, 12 HASTINGS 14 42, 51-52 (1960).
Diversification of risks and increased political and economic power may also increase long-run
profits. See Musgrave, supra note 8, at 403-04. Since the benefits of synergy result from the coopera-
tion of numerous affiliates, the income of each should include a share of the increased profits, even
though they are not recorded by separate accounting. See Note, Multinational Corporations, .supra note
3, at 1216.
From an economic viewpoint, unitary treatment is justified when (1) there is a substantial volume
of transactions among affiliated firms, so that transfer price manipulation is possible; or (2) there is
complete vertical integration among affiliated firms so that savings in transaction costs and econo-
mies in production can he achieved; or (3) Mere is horizontal interpendence among affiliated firms,
but one is not the customer of the other. MCLURE. DEFINING A UNE] ART BUSINESS: THE ECONOMIST'S
VIEW (National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 1125, 1983). Horizontal inter-
dependence may involve both economies of scale and scope and the difficulties of transferring
proprietary information. Id.
" See iafra notes 81-92 and accompanying text; Note, Multinational Corporations, supra note 3, at
1224-25.
" 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983).
" Id. at 2946.
" CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE, §§ 23101-23304a (West 1979 & Supp. 1983).
r" CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE, §§ 25101-25140 (West 1979 & Supp. 1983). In the words of the
Supreme Court, California "calculates the local tax base by first defining the scope of the 'unitary
business' of which the taxed enterprise's activities in the taxing jurisdiction form one part, and then
apportioning the total income of that 'unitary business' between the taxing jurisdiction and the rest of
the world on the basis of a formula taking into account objective measures of the corporation's
activities within and without the jurisdiction." 103 S. Ct. at 2940.
" Id, at 2942.
' 8
 CAL. REV. & TAX, CODE §§ 25101-25140 (West 1979 & Supp. 1983). Sections 25130 through
21140 of the California statute reproduce, with only minor variations, the Uniform Division of
Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA), approved by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws and by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association in 1957.
UNIF, DIVISION or INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT, 7a U.L.A. 91 (1979 & Supp. 1983). UDITPA has
been adopted substantially by 23 states, including California. Id.
" CAL- REV. & TAX. CODE § 25120(a) (West 1979 & Supp. 1983). The California statute, like
UDITPA, distinguishes between "business" income, which is apportionable, and "non-business"
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sides that a portion of this income shall he allocated to the St ate by application of a
formula based on property, payroll and sales." In order to apply the unitary business/
formula apportionment method to affiliated groups of corporations, as well as to single
corporate enterprises, Calitbrnia requires "combined reportMg" of multicorporate
unitary businesses..' Container Corporation o/' America v. Franchise Tax Board arose out of
California's taxation of an American corporation with subsidiaries located in foreign
countries. 22
Container Corporation of America (Container), a vertically integrated" manufac-
turer of paperboard packaging, is a Delaware corporation, headquartered in Illinois and
doing business in a number of states including California. 2.1 In 1963, 1964 and 1965, the
years at issue in this case, Container directly or indirectly owned between 66.7 percent
and 100 percent of twenty foreign subsidiaries. 25 Most of the foreign subsidiaries were
engaged in the same business as Container and were vertically integrated as well.' Sales
from Container to the foreign subsidiaries were insignificant." The subsidiaries were
relatively all10110111011S with respect to matters or personnel and day-to-day management,
both of which were in the hands of foreign local executives." Personnel transfers from
Container to its subsidiaries were rare." Container had one senior vice-president and
four other officers in charge of overseeing the foreign subsidiaries' operations, setting
standards of professionalism and profitability, solving major problems, and making
long-term decisions." Local decisions regarding capital expenditures by the subsidiaries
had to receive the consent of the parent. 31 A number of Container appointees sat on the
income, which is not. Id. Business income is defined in section 25120(a) as income earned in the
regular course of the niultijurisdictional corporation's trade or business. Id. Non-business income is
defined in section 25120(d) as any income other than business income. Id. at 25120(d). Non-
business income, including rents and royalties, capital gains, interest, and dividends, id. at § 25123, is
allocated entirely to one state, on the basis of either the corporation's commercial domicile or the
state where the asset is used or located. Id. at §g 25124-25127.
2 " Id. at 25 i 28. This sect ion defines [he apportionment formula as a fraction, the numerator of
which is the property factor plus the payroll factor plus the sales factor, and the denominator of
which is three. Id. The respective factors are the amount of the corporation's property, payroll and
sales within the state over the amount of the multijurisdictional corporation's property, payroll and
sales everywhere. Id, at 25129-25136.
21 Id. at	 25102.
22
 103 S. Ct. at 2945.
23 Vertical integration denotes the control by a single firm of different stages in [he same
productive process. F.M. SHERER, supra note 11, at 72-103. Typical examples of vertical integration
are: control by a single enterprise of the manufacture and sale of a product; the production, refining
and retail distribution of raw materials; or the manufacture of component parts and their assembly
into Final consumer products. Id. Some courts and commentators use the term "integration" loosely
to describe is firm's expansion into related, but not connected, productive processes or the pattern of
geographical expansion of a single enterprise.
" 103 S. Ct. at 2939 (1983).
" Id. at 2943. The subsidiaries were located in Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela, Panama, Austria,
Germany, Holland, and Italy. WhiteNack, State Tax Litigation After the Container Decision, 20 TAX
NOTES 771, 772 (September 5, 1983).
20 103 S. Ct. at 2943.
27 Id.
29
 Id.
29 Id. at 2943-44. While foreign employees occasionally visited Container's plants, there was no
formal training program in the United States. Id. at 2944.
3° Id. at 2944.
31 Id. .0 2944, 2948 n.19.
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subsidiaries' board of directors but were not usually active in local management. 32
 Con-
tainer either held directly or guaranteed approximately one-half of the subsidiaries'
long-term debt." Container also provided its subsidiaries with manufacturing techniques,
technical assistance, insurance and cost accounting consultation, either by contract or by
uncompensated, informal agreement." Container sometimes sold used equipment to its
subsidiaries or acted as their purchasing agent."
In its 1963, 1964 and 1965 California Franchise Tax Returns, Container included its
own corporate net earnings, but did not include any income of its foreign subsidiaries. 36
In calculating the share of its net income apportionable to California under the three-
factor payroll, property and sales formula, Container omitted all of its foreign sub-
sidiaries' payroll, property and sales.'" In 1969, the California Franchise Tax Board
issued notices of additional assessment to the corporation on the grounds that Container
should have treated its foreign subsidiaries as part of its unitary business, rather than as
passive investments.' Container paid the additional amounts under protest and then
sued in California Superior Court for a refund." The trial court upheld the state board's
assessments." The California Court of' Appeals affirmed.'" The California Supreme
Court refused to exercise discretionary review. 12
 The United States Supreme Court heard
the case on mandatory appeal and affirmed the judgment below."
In a five to three opinion" delivered by Justice Brennan, the Supreme Court
approved California's formula apportionment of the worldwide combined income of
multinational conglomerates for state corporate income tax purposes." The Court held
that. the California statute when applied to tax the income of a multinational enterprise
consisting of a United States parent company and foreign subsidiaries and affiliates
violates neither the due process clause nor the commerce clause of the United States
Constitution." The Court first held that the lower court had properly found Container
12 Id. at 2944. In its review of Container's structure, the Supreme Court noted tha«lecentraliza-
tion of management decisions and the parent's "hands off" attitude prevailed both in its domestic
and foreign operations, and was largely mandated by the realities of the packaging industry. Id. at
2944 n.8.
" Id. at 2944.
-24 Id.
ss Id.
31i
22 Id. at 2945.
" Id. at 2944. Income received from merely passive investments is not apportionable. See infra
text accompanying note 132. Including the overseas subsidiaries in Container's unitary business
increased the apportionable unitary income and decreased the percentage of that income attribut-
able to California. Id. The net effect was a higher tax liability for Container. Id. at 2945, 2945 nn.11 &
12.
" Id. at 2945.
4 " Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board (City & County of San Francisco
Superior Court No. 673492).
41 Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 117 Cal. App. 3d 988, 173 Cal. Rptr. 121
(1981).
42 103 S. Ct. at 2945.
43 Id.
" Id. at 2939. Justice Brennan was joined by Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Rehn-
quist. Id. Justice Powell filed a dissenting opinion, in which the Chief Justice and Justice O'Connor
joined. Id. at 2957. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Id.
as 103 S. Ct. at 2939, 2946, 2957.
.16 Id.
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and its foreign subsidiaries to constitute a unitary business for state income tax pur-
poses.' The Court also held that California's use of the standard three-factor formula to
apportion the income of such unitary business was fair:" Finall y , the Court found that the
foreign commerce clause 49 does not require California to adopt the separate accounting
method — often referred to as the "arm's length ." 50 approach — in evaluating the tax
consequences of intercorporate relationships, even though this is the method used by the
federal government and most foreign nations."
Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax Board represents the first time the
Stir» -eine Court has approved application of the unitary business principle and formula
apportionment to state taxation of enterprises doing business outside the United States or
beyond the "water's edge... 52 The Court also approved California's requirement of com-
bined reporting by multinational groups of affiliated corporations, at least in the context
of an American parent company with foreign subsidiaries and affiliates." In upholding
the decision of the California tax authorities. the Court in Container followed the trend
toward giving the states broader discretion in the field of income taxation of multijurisdic-
tional corporations. Consistent with its recent decisions it this field, the Court once more
demonstrated its reluctance to scrutinize closely state division-of-income practices." The
Court's deferential attitude toward state actions and its repeated references to Congress'
power to legislate in this area are likely to generate a powerful momentum for the
achievement of national uniformity with respect to state division-of-income rules for
corporate income taxation purposes."
Although the Container decision is a clear step toward the recognition of worldwide
solitary taxation of multinational enterprises, the Supreme Court expressly reserved
judgment on the application of the unitary business/formula apportionment method to a
foreign parent company with United States subsidiaries and affiliates." This apparent
17 Id. at 2939.
Id. at 2946, 2948-50.
4 " U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
" See infra notes 248-52 and accompanying text. See, Harley, International Division of the Income
Tax Rase of Multinational Enterprise: An Overview, 13 TAX NOTES 1563, 1564 (Dec. 28, 1981); Surrey,
Reflections on the Allocation of Income and Expenses Among National Tax Jurisdictions, 10 L. & POLICY INT'L.
Bus. 409, 413-14 (1978); Note, Multinational Corporations, supra note 3, at 1205 -08 (1976). Under the
separate accounting or arm's length approach the tax authorities respect formic] corporate lines and
treat each affiliated corporation as a separate entity. Harley, supra, at 1564. later-corporate transac-
tions are judged by the standard of the arrangements which would have been made between
um -elated parties, dealing at arm's length. Id. If the intragroup transactions differ from those
arrangements, then an adjustment which applies the arm's length criterion is made.
s' 103 S. Ct. at 2955-56.
" Id, at 2946.
53 See infra notes 340-47 and accompanying text.
54 See infra notes 356-59 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 360-63 and accompanying text.
" 103 S. Ct. at 2952 n.26. See infra notes 261-64 and accompanying text. In the Court's words
"we have no need to address in this opinion the constitutionality of combined apportionment with
respect to state taxation of domestic corporations with foreign parents or foreign corporations with
either foreign parents or foreign subsidiaries," 103 S. Ct. at 295211,26, and again, "we recognize that
the fact that the legal incidence of a tax falls on a corporation whose formal corporate domicile is
domestic might be less significant in the case of a domestic corporation that was owned by foreign
interests. We need not decide here whether such a case would require us to alter our analysis." id. at
2956 n.32.
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dichotomy between Foreign and United States parents leaves a gap in the definition of the
constitutional boundaries to state income taxation of multinationals."
This casenote discusses the worldwide unitary taxation of the combined income of
multinational corporations by the states. Part 1 of the article outlines the development of
the unitary business concept and formula apportionment for state income tax purposes
through the analysis of significant Supreme Court decisions." In Part 11, the Court's
decision in Container is presented and the constitutional limitations on state division-of-
income rules are examined separately. 59 hi Part 111, the Container opinion is analyzed in
detail in light of the preceding case law and numerous scholarly commentaries on the
subject of unitary taxation." Finally, in Part 1V, the impact of the Container decision is
evaluated."' This casenote submits that the Court's attitude of judicial deference toward
state tax practices and toward any eventual congressional enactment in this area creates a
propitious climate for the development of a uniform solution to division-of-income
problems, either through a negotiated compromise among the states, business and the
federal government or through federal legislation."'
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITARY BUSINESS CONCEPT AND FORMULA APPORTIONMENT FOR
STATE TAX PURPOSES
A. Early Properly Tax Cases
The unitary business principle has its roots in the "unit rule" of taxation, which first
emerged in the state ad valorem property tax cases involving railroads, express companies
and other transportation businesses."' In Adams Express Co. v. Ohio Slate Auditor," the
Supreme Court held that a slate may value the property of a company operating in
several states as a unit and tax a fair and proper share of such property. 65
 The Adams
Express Court stated that physical unity is not necessary, nor is unity of ownership
sufficient to justify treating property as a unit for tax purposes.'" The Court held that
unity of use and management of property located in different states to carry on the
business is the proper test for a "unit" of property." According to the Adams Express
Court, unitary treatment of property contained within and without a state is justified
whets, given the nature of the business, property located in one state possesses a value
only in combination with and from use in connection with the property located else-
where."' The Adams Express case indicates that in applying the unitary business concept, a
state may apportion intangible values to those states where the business activity of the
57 See infra notes 348-49 and accompanying text.
5" See infra notes 63 -203 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 207 - 301 and accompanying text.
"" See infra notes 302-49 and accompanying text.
"` See infra notes 350-64 and accompanying text.
62 See infra notes 360-62 and accompanying text.
" 3 Dexter, The Unitary Concept, supra' note 3, at 184; J. Hellerstein, Recent Developments, supra note
3, at 488.
" 165 U.S. 194 (1897).
" 5 Id. at 220-21.
"" Id. at 222.
67 Id
"" Id.
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corporation is carried on through its use of tangible property and other income produc-
ing activities. 69
A number of later property tax cases further shaped the concept of unitary tax-
ation." These cases allowed a state to determine the in-state property or income subject to
taxation by reference to the total property or income of the entire multijurisdictional
enterprise. This method of arriving at the state's tax base is appropriate regardless of
whether the enterprise conducts its business in a single or multiple corporate form, so
long as the business is unitary."
B. Early State Income Tax Cases
The concept of unitary taxation developed in the property tax cases was carried
further beginning in 1920 in a number of cases dealing with state income taxes on
manufacturing and mercantile businesses. In Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain,"
the Supreme Court upheld Connecticut's apportionment of the income of a multistate
corporation through a formula employing the location of corporate property as the sole
factor." The Underwood Company conducted all its manufacturing operations in Con-
necticut, but had branch offices and inventories in other states." The Supreme Court
found that the corporation's profit was generated by a series of transactions beginning
with manufacturing in one state and ending with sales in other states." According to the
Court, this made it impossible for state tax authorities to allocate specifically the profits
earned within each state." The Court concluded that formula apportionment was an
appropriate method to determine the corporation's fair share of the burden of' taxation."
The Supreme Court considered another application of formula apportionment in
Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Commissioner." In that case the Court upheld New
York's application of a two-factor formula based on property and sales to the income of a
British manufacturer importing beer into the United States through a New York office."
In Bass, Ratcliff, as in Underwood, the Court stated that the taxpayer corporation has the
burden of showing that the statutory method of apportionment is arbitrary and unrea-
sonable."
" Id. at 223. Dexter, The Unitary Concept, supra note 3, at 187-88.
" See, e.g., Wallace v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66 (1920) (out-of-state property not apportionable unless
it "adds to the value" of in-state property); Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U.S. 275 (1919)
(Court found application of track mileage formula unreasonable in the particular circumstances of
the case); Fargo v. Hart, 193 U.S. 490 (1904) (property not associated with company's unitary
business cannot be apportioned); Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co, v. Backus,
154 U.S. 439 (1894) (ownership of single railway system by separate corporations does not defeat
unitary concept); Commonwealth v. Southern Railway Co., 193 Ky. 474,237 S.W. 11 (1921) (in-state
railroad owned and operated by out-of-state parent resulted in taxation of parent); see generally,
Dexter, The Unitary Concept, supra note 3, at 188-90.
" Id. at 189-90.
77 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
73 Id. at 120-21.
74 Id. at 119.
75 Id. at 120.
73 Id. at 121.
" Id.
7 ' 266 U.S. 271 (1924).
" Id. at 282.
" Id. at 283-84; Underwood, 254 U.S. at 121.
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The unitary business test for state income tax purposes was developed primarily
from cases . arising from California tax practices. In Butler Bros. v. Iticeo!gall," an Illinois
corporation engaged in the wholesale dry goods business, operated several independent
distributing houses in various states, including California. 82 Through the operation of a
central buying division the corporation was able to obtain lower prices for the goods sold
by all the houses and thereby achieved significant economies of scale." The Supreme
Court, relying on a finding of unity of ownership, management and use among the
independent distributing houses located in different states, held that the existence of
economies of scale was sufficient to make the business unitary." The Court thus adopted
the so called "three-unities lest" articulated by the California Court of Appeals below in its
Butler Bros. opinion." The California court developed a classic formulation of the deter-
minative factors to be considered under this test: `.( I) unity of ownership; (2) unity of
operation, as evidenced by central purchasing, advertising, accounting and management
divisions; (3) unity of use in its centralized executive force arid general system of opera-
tion.""
The test for unitariness was further developed in Edison California Stores, Inc. v.
McColgan, 87 another case arising under California tax law. In Edison the California Court
of Appeals developed the "three-unities test," stating that if the portion of the business
conducted within the state is "dependent upon or contributes to" the portion of the business
conducted without the stale, the operation within and without the state are unitary:" The
"three-unities test" and the "contribution and dependence" test may be considered com-
plementary.
Some state courts have taken a very expansive view of the unitary business principle
and have stretched the above tests so for as to cover almost unrelated activities carried on
by separate parts of a firm in different states. In Superior Oil Co. v. Franchise Tax Board,"
for example, the California Court of Appeals held that the in-stale operations of a
nonintegrated oil company contributed substantially to and were substantially dependent
upon its out-of-state operations. In Superior Oil Co. the company engaged in no interstate
sales, but its California headquarters handled accounting, purchases of equipment, and
insurance matters for the entire enterprise, within and without the state." The taxpayer
in Superior Oil sought unitary treatment in order to offset in-state profits with out-of-state
8 ' 315 U.S. 501 (1942).
" 2 Id. at 504.
" Id. at 506.
84 Id. at 508-09. The Court was satisfied that the corporation's separate accounting system,
whereby all goods were billed at cost to the regional offices and overhead and operating expenses of
the central office were shared as well, was accurate and fair.fd. at 504-05. The Court noted, however,
that it "need not impeach the integrity of [the separate) accounting system" to uphold formula
apportionment, because "accounting practices ... may vary considerably according to the problem at
hand." Id. at 507. The Court's finding of unity of ownership and management, functional integra-
tion, and economies of scale supported the state's reliance on property, payroll, and sales to reflect
the relative contribution of the activities in the various states to the production of the total unitary
income. Id. at 509.
8 ' 17 Cal. 2d 664, 1l 1 P.2d 334 (1941).
86 Id. at 678, I 1 1 P.2d at 341.
30 Cal. 2d 472, 183 P.2d 16 (1947).
" Id. at 481, 183 P.2d at 21.
88 60 Cal. 2d 406, 386 P.2d 33 (1963).
9° Id. at 415-16, 386 P.2d at 39.
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losses."' The Court granted this treatment. 92 Other state courts have taken an unduly
restrictive view of the unitary business principle."
The progressive consolidation and expansion of unitary taxation of multijui'isdic-
tional corporations has not gone unchallenged. While the Supreme Court, as well as state
courts, generally have shown a significant degree of deference to state division-of-income
practices, taxpayers have at times succeeded in attacking the constitutional validity of a
state's apportionment formula. In Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina," a company
manufactured leather goods in one state and sold them in other states and abroad." The
evidence showed that while the in-state manufacturing operations generated an average
of seventeen per cent of the profits, approximately eighty per cent of the profits was
allocated by the manufacturing state to itself through formula apportionment." The
Supreme Court found that although the taxpayer's business was unitary, formula appor-
tionment operated unreasonably and arbitrarily because it attributed to the taxing state a
percentage of income "out of" all appropriate proportion" to business transacted in the
state."' The Court, therefore, struck down the state's application of the formula appor-
tionment method."
The tests developed in the early cases have meaning only in light of the particular
facts of each individual case. For this reason, modern courts, in applying those tests,
consider all of the facts and circumstances in determining whether the taxpayer's business
was unitary or whether apportionment resulted in the taxation of extraterritorial values.""
It has always been clearly understood, however, that the burden is on the taxpayer to
introduce clear and cogent evidence that unitary taxation is inappropriate.'"
C. Recent Refinement's of the Constitutional Doctrines Affecting Unitary Taxation
Since 1978, the Supreme Court has addressed the constitutional limitations on state
income taxation of multijurisdictional corporations in a number of cases. In the landmark
case of Mobil Oil Corporation v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 11 ' the Court held that
formula apportionment does not violate the due process and commerce clauses of the
Constitution so long as the taxpayer's business is unitary, even though formal corporate
distinCtions are disregarded for tax purposes.' °2 In the subsequent cases of ASARCO, Inc.
" Id. at 408, 386 P.2d at 34. This case was somewhat out of the ordinary. Normally the taxpayer
seeks to avoid unitary treatment. Here, however, unitary taxation decreased the taxpayer's tax
liability in California, and the state tax authorities tried to deny that taxpayer's business was unitary.
Id. In this unusual role, the state tried to limit the scope of the "contribution and dependence test - by
arguing that "the employment of an allocation formula is justified only when the various local
operations are so essential to the overall operations that it is impossible to make separate accounting
computations." Id. at 413, 380 P.2d at 37. 'the Court explicitly rejected this position. Id. at 414, 386
P.2d at 38.
"2 Id. at 415, 386 P.2d at 38.
73 See, e.g., Skelly Oil Co. v. Coomer of Taxation, 269 Minn. 351, 131 N.W.2d 632 (1964) (integrated
oil company's marketing and production operations held not unitary).
"4 283 U.S. 123 (1931),
"' Id. at 126-27.
" Id. at 127-28.
" Id. at 135.
9S Id.
" See, e.g., Container, 103 S. Cr. at 2947-48.
110 Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. North Carolina, 297 U.S. 682, 688 (1935).
"" 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
102
 See infra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
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v. Idaho Slate Tax Commission' and F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Department
of the State of New Mexico,'" however, the Court showed that the requirements set forth in
Mobil were effective limitations on the states' application of unitary taxation. In these two
cases, the Court held that actual integration and control must be found before the
different parts of a firm may be held to constitute a unitary business.'" Furthermore, in
the 1979 case of Japan Lines, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,'" the Court held that the risk of
international double taxation and the need for federal uniformity in matters of foreign
relations are additional considerations that limit the availability to the states of unitary
taxation in the case of multinational corporations, when international commerce is in-
volved."'
I. The Outlines of Unitary Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corporate Income
The Supreme Court signaled its renewed interest in state division-of-income prob-
lems in 1978. In Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair,'" the Court upheld Iowa's single-
factor sales formula for apportioning income. This decision laid the foundation and set
the tone for subsequent Supreme Court decisions in this area of the law.'"
Moorman involved an Illinois corporation that manufactured animal feed in Illinois
and sold about twenty per cent of its production in Iowa, where it had over five hundred
salespeople and six warehouses."° In upholding Iowa's tax treatment of this corporation,
the Court held that states have wide latitude in the selection of apportionment formu-
las.'" Moreover, the Court stated it would interfere only when the taxpayer has proved
by clear and cogent evidencem that formula apportionment has led to a "grossly dis-
torted result.."" 3 The Court insisted that actual double taxation must he established on
the record, or it will he viewed as "speculative."'" The Court further indicated that even
assuming some overlap in the taxation of a multistate corporation's income, it would not
invalidate formula apportionment in the absence of federal legislation," 5 The Court
refused to engage in "extensive judicial lawmaking" and referred dissatisfied taxpayers to
1°3 102 S. Ct. 3103 (1982).
I °4 102 S. Ct. 3128 (1982).
ios See infra notes 158-61, 171-76 and accompanying text.
I" 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
'°' See infra notes 195-201 and accompanying text.
I" 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
1 °" Id. at 281.
"° Id. at 269.
n' Id.
112 Id. at 274 (citing Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 507 (1942)).
"I Id. at '274 (citing Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. State Tax Corrim'r, 390 U.S. 317, 326 (1968)).
114 437 U.S. at 276. The Court distinguished the case of General Motors Corp. v. District of
Columbia, 380 U.S. 553 (1965), where it had striken down a single-factor sales formula, as based on
the requirements of the D.C. statute, not the U.S. Constitution. 437 U.S. at 274-75. The General
Motors opinion contains some dicta to the effect that a single state's use of a single-factor formula
when the vast majority of states apportions income on the basis of a three-factor formula would
ordinarily result in multiple taxation of corporate income. General Motors, 380 U.S. at 556-57. The
majority in Moorman, however, disregarded the allegation that Iowa's single-factor formula provided
a direct commercial advantage to local business by discriminating against out-of-state manufacturers
selling their products within the state. Moorman, 437 U.S. at 276. justices Powell and Blackmun, in
dissent, raised the issue of state protectionism. Id. at 282, 283-84.
15 437 U.S. at 278-79.
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Congress."' The Moorman decision stresses three recurring themes that underlie the
Court's decisions on state division-of-income rules: I) wide latitude for the states in
apportioning the income of multijurisdictional firms; 2) self-restraint by the Court in
scrutinizing state practices; and 3) deference to Congress as the appropriate source of
uniform rules in this area.''
The taxation of income front intangible property, particularly of dividends received
by multistate or multinational corporations from their out-of-state affiliates, was a very
controversial issue for states adopting the unitary method because of the contention that
intangible income is inherently nonapportionable.'" In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of
Taxes of Vermont,"" the Supreme Court extended the application of the unitary business
principle to dividends received by a corporation front its fbreign subsidiaries and
1 " Id. at 280. The Court refused to hold that the commerce clause itself, without implementing
legislation by Congress, prohibits any overlap in the computation of taxable income by the states. Id.
at 278. The Court noted that some overlap is likely to result whenever a multistate firm does business
in states having different. division-of-income rules. Id. A constitutional requirement of precisely
apportioned income, in the Court's opinion, would be tantamount to a requirement of national
uniform division
-of-income rules. Id. at 279. The Court observed, however, that uniformity is a
matter of political and economic judgment and that the Constitution is neutral with respect to the
content of any uniform rule. Id. The Court noted that only Congress has the power and the authority
to dictate uniform rules. Id. at 28{}.
17 W. Hellerstein, Slate Income Taxation, supra note 3, at 404. See also Schwartz, Commerce, the
States, and the Burger Court, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 409, 436 (1979).
1 " See Dexcer,Taxation of income from Intangibles of Multistate
-Multinational Corporations, 29 VAN!).
L. REV. 401, 401-03 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Dexter, Taxation of Income from Intangibles]. The main
issue was whether such income should be apportioned or allocated specifically to the state of its
putative source. Specific at/out/ion has in general been largely rejected because of the inherent
difficulties in identifying the particular source of income, See W. Hellerstein, State income Taxation,
supra note 3, at 901-02. The great bulk of the intangible income of corporations in the United States
is derived from investments in affiliated corporations. Dexter, Taxation of Income from Intangibles,
supra, at 402. Originally taxpayers took the position that imercorporate dividends should be exempt
from slate taxation since they have no "source" apart from the underlying income - producing
activities of the payor corporation, Id. A fortiori "foreign source" dividends from a foreign affiliate
should not be subject to state taxation at all. Id. at 404 -05. As a compromise position, taxpayers later
conceded that domestic intercorporate dividend income from unaffiliated corporations could be
attributed to the commercial domicile of the payee corporation, while all other dividend income
should be exempt, Id. On the other hand, the states argued that dividends received from affiliates
and subsidiaries, either domestic or foreign, constituting an integral part of the taxpayer's unitary
business should he apportioned among the states where the taxpayer carries on its business activ-
ities. Id.
Before Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes of Vermont, 495 U.S. 425 (1980), the issues were:
(1) the extent to which dividend income and other intangible income should be exempt or specifically
allocated to the commercial domicile of the taxpayer corporation; (2) whether foreign source
dividends should be treated differently from domestic source dividends; and (3) whether income
from intangibles could be subject to the apportionment rules that generally applied to other classes of
income. Dexter, Taxation of Income from Intangibles, supra, at 905. According to Dexter, the four basic
alternatives available were:
(1) assign the income to the payor source from which the intangible income is de-
rived; (2) attribute the income to the commercial domicile of the payee corporation;
(3) apportion the income among the states in which the payee corporation carries on its
business activities; or (4) apportion the income among the states concerned by taking
into account in the formula some or all of the property, payroll, and sales of the payor
as well as the payee corporation.
hi.
"" 945 U.S. 425 (1980).
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affiliates.' Mobil Oil Corporation, commercially domiciled in New York, was engaged in
a vertically integrated multinational petroleum business."' Mobil's activities in Vermont
were limited to marketing. 1 ^ 2
 The corporation derived a large portion of its income in the
form of dividends from subsidiaries and affiliates operating abroad.' 23 The state of
Vermont imposed an income tax on corporations doing 'business within the state and
adopted the unitary business/formula apportionment method to tax multijurisdictional
corporations.' 24
 Mobil excluded its fbreign source dividends in reporting its apportion-
able income, claiming that these dividends were taxable exclusively in the state of Mobil's
commercial domicile.'" Vermont disagreed and sought to include foreign source divi-
dends in the apportionable tax base.' The Supreme Court upheld the state's claim to tax
the dividends received from foreign affiliates. 127
The Court stated in Mobil that the "linchpin" of apportionability in the field of state
income taxation is the unitary business principle,"s The Court held that in order to
exclude its dividend income from the apportionable tax base, a taxpayer corporation
must show that the income was earned in the course of' activities unrelated to its activities
within the taxing state.'" According to the Court, dividends from subsidiaries and
affiliates fall within the parent's apportionable income base when they reflect profits
derived from a functionally integrated enterprise.'" The Court looked at the "underly-
ing economic realities" rather than We "form of investment -
 or the "Ruin of business
organization," thereby disregarding formal corporate lines."' The Court noted, how-
ever, that dividend income received front merely passive investments is not apportionable
where the business activities of the dividend payor have "nothing to do" with the activities
120 Id. at +19.
121 Id. at 428.
122 hi.
"" Id. at 430.
124 Id. at 429. VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 32, §§ 5811(18), 5833(a) (1981).
Izs 445 U.S. at 430, 433.
L" Id. at 431 -32.
127 Id. at 449. The Court's decision turned on the resolution of procedural as well as substantive
issues. Dexter, Tax Apportionment of the Income of a Unitary Business: An Examination of Mobil Oil Corp. V.
Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 1981 REv. 107, 107 (1981) thereinafter cited as Dexter,
Tax Apportionment]. Mobil did not contend that the apportionment tOrmula operated un ►irly by
attributing to Vermont more net income than was reasonably related to Mobil's activities there. 445
U.S. at 434. It did not argue, until it was too late, that combined reporting should be allowed. Id. at
434 n.11. Nor did Mobil, in the Court's opinion, offer evidence that its dividends and stock
investments were unrelated to its unitary business. Id. at 439. Mobil instead claimed that dividends
from a "foreign source" by their very nature are not apportionable income. ht. at. 434. The Court was
then able to narrow the issues to "whether there is something about die character of income earned
from investments in affiliates and subsidiaries operating abroad" that makes dividends therefrom
non-apportionable. Id. at 434-35. The Court concluded that there was not. Id. at 439,
129 4,15 U.S. at 439.
129 Id .
1 :12 Ill. at 440.
Id. at 441. Mobil, in its reply brief, tried to argue that Vermont's failure to require "combined
apportionment - violated the due process clause. Id. at 441 n.15. The Court refused to address this
argument, as it was untimely, unsupported by the record and "an afterthought." Id. See generally
Nackenson & Feinschreiber, The Unitary Method of State Taxation AJ'er Mobil and Exxon, 11 Tax
AuvisER 708 (1980). Justice Stevens, in dissent, disagreed. 445 U.S. at 460. lie believed that a
challenge to the apportionable income tax base necessarily implied a challenge to tile apportionment
formula. Id. at 460-61 (Stevens, J., dissenting). His opinion clearly supported worldwide combined
reporting of unitary enterprises. Id.
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of the recipient in the taxing state." 2 The Court dismissed Mobil's complaint of duplica-
tive taxation, finding it unsupported by the record.'"
The principles set forth in Mobil were reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Exxon
Corp. v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue."' Exxon, an integrated oil company operating
worldwide, limited its activities in Wisconsin to the marketing of petroleum products.'"
Wisconsin imposed a corporate income tax using a three-factor apportionment for-
mula. 13 " Exxon's internal system of functional accounting separated its income into three
distinct categories: marketing, exploration and production, and refining)" Exxon intro-
duced evidence that each one of its functional departments was organized as a separate
unit, independently responsible For its own performance' and, therefore, did not
constitute a unitary business for state income tax purposes.'" Transfers of products and
raw materials among the three functional departments were theoretically based on com-
petitive wholesale market prices."" Exxon, however, was a single corporate entity with a
centralized corporate staff providing a wide range of critical services to the entire corpo-
ration."' The Court held that Exxon was a highly integrated business which benefited
from an "umbrella of centralized management and controlled interaction." The Court.
concluded that the taxpayer's business was unitary,'" reasoning that the taxpayer's
internal accounting system was not binding on the state for tax purposes.''
2. Effective Limitations of the States' Discretion to Apply the Unitary Concept
The Court's decisions in Mobil and Exxon indicated an attitude of judicial restraint
and willingness to allow the states wide discretion in their division-of-income practices. In
both cases, the Court expanded the notion of unitary business, focusing on the actual
interdependence of the taxpayer's subsidiaries and affiliates or divisions, as evidenced by
132 445 U.S. at 441-42.
131 Id. at 444. The Court said, in dicta, that even assuming the state of commercial domicile has
the authority to lay ,aunt tax on dividend income, there is no reason why that power should be
exclusive when the dividends reflect income from a unitary business, part of which is conducted in
other states. Id. at 446-47. The Court stated that there is "nothing talismanic about the concept of
'business suns' or 'commercial domicile'." Id. at 445. Ultimately, however, the Court refrained from
clarifying [he multiple taxation issue other than to say t hat such an issue would not be decided on the
"vagaries" of [he state of commercial domicile's tax policy towards dividend income. Id. at 444. See
generally Dexter, Tax Apportionment, supra note 127, at 114.
13 ' 447 U.S. 207 (1980).
135 Id. tat 212-13.
's" Id. at 213 - 14; Wis. STAI. § 71.07(2) (1969 & Stipp. 1983 - 1984).
137 447 U.S. at 210.
1" Id. at 212. Taxpayer's departments were actually in competition with each other and with
outsiders for company resources, capital and business opportunities. Id.
139 Id .
140 Id.
1 ' 1 Id. at 21S. Such services included centralized purchasing. interdepartmental coordination to
achieve operating efficiencies, nationwide distribution, uniform brand names, advertising, and credit
cards. Id.
142 Id. at 224.
143 id .
11 ' a at 221. It has been noted that after Ex.vm only ''t he most sanguine taxpayer would harbor
the hope that the Supreme Court rimy still be moved by separate accounting evidence to invalidate
the application of a three-factor apportionment Immula to the income of a unitary, business."
W. Hellerstein, State Income Taxation, supra note 3, at 412.
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integration of the operating functions, centralization management, economies of scale
and, of course, common ownership and control."' The Supreme Court reversed this
expansive trend in ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commissionl" and in E. W. Woolworth
Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Department of New Mexico."' In these cases, the Court applied
the same doctrines it had used in Mobil and Exxon, but linttid the taxpayers' business non-
unitary,' In ASARCO and Woolworth, the Court took a more active role in scrutinizing
state division-of-income practices and turned the unitary business principle into a con-
stitutional restraint on state taxation powers.H 9
ASARCO, Inc., a New jersey corporation headquartered in New York. was princi-
pally engaged in mining, smelting and refining.' It conducted roughly 2.5 per cent of its
business in Idaho.''' ASARCO owned between 34 per cent and 52.7 per cent of five
subsidiaries, front which it collected dividends and other income from intangible prop-
er( y." 2
 None of these subsidiaries conducted business in Idaho. Idaho imposed a corpo-
rate income tax upon mu hijurisdictional corporations, derived from the state's version of
the Uniform Division of Incoine for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA).' 53
 ASARCO sought. to
exclude income from its five subsidiaries from its apportionable tax base, arguing that
these subsidiaries were not part of its unitary business."' The state maintained that
dividend income from these five subsidiaries was properly included in the apportionable
tax base, regardless of whether the links between the subsidiaries and ASARCO were
sufficient to justify unitary treatment, because ASARCO'S receipt of dividends from each
subsidiary constituted apportionable "business" income to ASARCO.'" The Supreme
Court held that Idaho's efforts to tax ASARCO'S foreign source income violated the due
process prohibition against extraterritorial taxation.'"
The issue in ASARCO was whether income received by a nondmniciliary corporation,
doing business within the state, from corporations with which it was not vertically inte-
grated should be included in the apportionable tax base, when the taxpayer held "sub-
stantial ownership interests in and enjoyed a variety of working relationships with such
'" See generally Casenote, State Taxation of Nondomiciliary Csiporations, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
191 (1983).
146
	 S. Ct. 3103 (1982).
' 47 102 S. Ct. 3128 (1982).
1 ' Woolworth, 102 S. Ct. at 3139; ASARCO, 102 S.C.t. at 3112.
Casenote, 96 HARv. L. REV. 62, 87 (1982).
m' 102 S. Ct. at 3105.
151 Id .
152 Id. at 3105, 3106 and n.2. ASARCO owned 52.7 percent of 111.LM. Holdings, lad., a publicly
owned corporation engaged in mining, smelting, and refining in Australia and in the United
Kingdom; 34 percent of General Cable Corp. and 34 percent of Revere Copper and Brass, Inc., both
publicly owned United States corporations which make cable and copper wares, respectively; 49
percent of ASARCO Mexicana, S.A., a widely held Mexican company which mines and smelts lead
and copper; and 51.5 percent of Southern Peru Copper Corp., a company owned by four sharehold-
ers. Id. at 3106 and n,2. Besides dividends, ASARCO received interest income from convertible
debentures and notes and realized capital gains on sales of stock from its subsidiaries. Id. at 3106. See
also Casenote, Taxation: State Taxation of Multinational Corporations ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State
Comia'n.; F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dept., 23 HA RV. I NT'L.. J. 480, 480 - 81 nn.2 -5
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Casenote, ASARCO and Woolworth].
15 ' Idaho Code § 63-3027 (1976 & Supp. 1982-83); see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
'" 102 S. Ct. at 3107-08.
155 Id. at 3108.
156 Id. at 3116.
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corporations.'" The Court disagreed with the state's argument that intangible income
should be included in the apportionable tax base if die intangible property is acquired,
managed or disposed of for purposes relating to or contributing to the taxpayer's own
business.''" According to the Court, the meaning of the unitary business concept would
be destroyed if a finding of unitariness were based on the mere fact that investment in a
subsidiary benefits lite parent company. 15 " The Court reasoned that the more limited
elements of integration and control were better indicators in determining whether a
business is unitary.'" Applying this narrower test to the facts of the case, the Court held
that ASARCO had sustained the burden of proving that the subsidiaries at issue were
"discrete business enterprises - and not part of its unitary business.'" Consequently, clue
process prohibited unitary taxation of ASARCO.'" Threejust ices dissented in ASARCO,
eschewing the Court's narrow view and accusing the Court of substituting an "oversim-
plified test - of active operational control and functional integration for the "multifaceted
analysis'' used in Mobil and Exxon to determine whether a business was unitary.'"
In F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Department of the State of New Mexico,'"
a companion case of the ASARCO decision, the Court also found that a state's effort to tax
an apportionable share 01' dividends"' from foreign subsidiaries violated the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.'" Woolworth, a New York corporation, was en-
gaged in the general retail merchandise business throughout the United States, including
New Mexico.'" It wholly owned three foreign subsidiaries and owned 52.7 percent of a
fourth, all of which engaged in chain store retailing operations independent from those
of Woolworth,'" Woolworth sought to exclude from its apportionable income tax base
the substantial dividends received from its four foreign subsidiaries, but the state of New
Mexico disagreed.'"" The Su preme Court sustained the taxpayer's position.' 7 " The Court
found that Woolworth's business was not unitary, because Woolworth had chosen not to
exercise its potential for controlling its foreign subsidiaries."' The Court stated that,
when dividend-paying subsidiaries operate as discrete business enterprises, they should
'" Id. at 3107. See also W. hiellerstein, State Income Taxation, supra note 3, at 415.
155 102 S. Ct. at 3114.
' 5" Id. The Court found that the business of a corporation requires that it earn money to
continue operation and yield profits. N. Consequently, of its operations, including any investment
made, contribute or relate to the corporate purpose.. Id.
116
 Id. at 3112-13. The integration test permits apportionment when transactions between
in-state and out-of-state operations, or shared costs and benefits, allow local activities to contribute to
out-of-state income. Casenote, 96 fishy. L. REV. 62, 92-93 (1983). The control test recognizes that
apportionment is inappropriate unless the division of benefits and burdens between the in-slate and
out -of-state activities is noi at arm's length and is, therefore, inherently suspect. Id.
1 " 1 102 S. Ct. at 3111. A commentator noted that the Court's decision may be due more to its
view of the facts, than to its definition of a unitary business. W. Hellerstein, income State Taxation,
supra note 3, at 418.
' 62 102 S. CI. at 3116.
"3 102 S. Ct. at 3123. justice O'Connor's dissent was joined by justices Blackmun and Rehn-
quist. Id. at 3117.
'" 102 S. Ct. 3128 (1982),
1h5 N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7.4-1 m 7-4-21 (1983).
" 1" 102 S. Ct. at 3139.
'" Id. at 3131.
"5 Id.
169 Id. at 3132.
' 7" Id. at 3139.
Ill Id. at 3139, 3138.
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not be treated as unitary with die parent company merely because of the latter's potential
to operate them as divisions of a single integrated emerprise. 172 In evaluating the rela-
tionship of Woolworth to its four dividend-paying foreign subsidiaries, the Court. found
little fu nctional integration, centralization of management, or economies of scale. 17 ' The
Court drew a clear distinction between a retail Merchandising business and the kind of
multinational business in winch refined, processed, or manufactured products may he
produced in one or more countries and marketed in various countries.' In the former
case, a flow of international trade, an interchange of personnel, and substantial mutual
interdependence are lacking.' The Court therefore concluded that the state was at-
tempting to reach extraterritorial values, wholly unrelated to the in-state business of the
taxpayer, in violation of due process standards.'"
In essence, the ASARCO Court found t hat "uncontrolled integrated affiliates" are not
a unitary business.'" The Woolworth decision indicated t h at "unintegrated controlled
affiliates" are not unitary. 17 " In both cases, the Supreme Court found that a portion of
investment income is taxable in a jurisdiction if, and only if, the business activities of the
issuer of the securities are unitary with those of the security holder.' 79
The ASARCO and Woolworth decisions support taxpayer challenges to state division-
of-income rules under the due process clause.'" The long-term impact of these decisions
has been debated widely. One commentator praised t be Supreme Court's "new attitude of
judicial vigilance" as opposed to its prior "detached judicial tolerance" and "hands-olf
attitude."'" Others have criticized the Court's approach as too narrow and have argued
for a limited interpretation of these two cases.'"
Commentators front both sides, however, agree that the ASARCO and Woolworth
opinions do not necessarily prohibit a state from apportioning income from intangibles
received from an out-of-mate payor with which the payee is not conducting a unitary
business." 3 The general rule is that long-term portfolio investments unrelated to the
payee's day-to-day operations are ordinarily nonapportionable. This is not true, how-
ever, for short-term investments of working capital.'" Moreover, an exception must be
t" Id. at 3134.
"3 Id. at 3135-38.
" 4 Id. at 3138-39.
1 " Id. at 3139.
'' Id.
"7 Casenote, 96 HAtiv, L. REV, 62, 90 (1982).
17" Id.
Id. at 93.
Casenote, Due Process and the Unitary Principle of State Taxation: ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax
Commission; F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Department of New Mexico, 36 TAX LAW 960,
468 (1982).
1 " Hellerstein, State Income Taxation, supra note 3, at 422 -23.
" 2 Greene, ASARCO and Woolworth: Anomalous Anachronisms with Limited Precendential Value, 18
TAX NOTES 795, 795 (March 7, 1983); see also, Lath rop, Due Process Considerations and the Apportionment
of Dividend Income: A Dissent from the ASARCO and Woolworth Decisions, 16 TAX NOTES 3, 3 (July 5,
1982). One author termed ASARCO and Woolworth an "anomalous anachronism with limited prece-
dential value." Greene, supra, at 795.
183 Greene, supra note 182, at 801; W. Hellerstein, State Income Taxation, supra note 3, at 416-17,
421
184 Greene, supra note 182, at 801; W. Hellerstein, State Income Taxation, supra note 3, at 416-17,
421. Dividends from temporary or short-term investment of working capital or other current funds
for ordinary operating uses generally have been held to be apportionable without any requirement
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made for income from intangibles covered by the Corn. Products doctrine, dealing with the
capital gain-ordinary income division between investment and business for federal in-
come taxation purposes.'" It is also important to note that the Court in ASARCO and
Woolworth did nut depart from or overrule its prior decisions in unitary business cases.'"
The Court, instead, explicitly relied on these decisions and merely shifted the emphasis
toward the analysis of the facts of the case in ASARCO and Woolworth. Indeed, the Court
repeatedly cited Mobil as the leading authority in the area, clearly showing no intention to
depart from it.'"
3. Additional Restraints for Cases Involving International Commerce
The due process standards articulated by the Court in ASARCO and Woolworth are
adequate for domestic corporations operating in several states. When, however, multina-
tional corporations arc subjected to unitary taxation by the states, additional constitu-
tional issues arise tinder the foreign commerce clause, because state action is then likely to
affect international commerce and foreign relations. In this context, the case of japan
Line, Ltd. v. County of Las Angles' furnished multinational firms with what many hailed at
the time as an important new avenue for attacking apportionment of income from
foreign sources.'"
In japan Lhre, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether instrumentalities of
foreign commerce which are owned, based and registered abroad and which are used
exclusively in international commerce may be subjected to apportioned ad valorem prop-
erty taxation by a slate.'" Six Japanese shipping companies operated vessels, based in
Japan, for the purpose of transporting cargo containers owned and registered in Ja-
pan,"' The containers were subject to property tax in Japan and were, in I act, taxed
there.'" The county of Los Angeles imposed a property tax on the foreign containers on
the basis of their average presence in California.'" The Supreme Court held that Los
of functional integration between payor and payee. J. Hellerstein, Allocation and Apportionment of
Dividends and the Delineation of the Unitaty Business, 14 TAx Notes 155. 159 (Jan. 25, 1982) { hereinafter
cited as J. Hellerstein, Allocation and Apportionmentl.
" 5 J. Hellerstein, Allocation and Apportionment, supra rune 184. at 159. See generally S. SURREY,
W. WARREN, P. MGDANJEL l I I. Auur, FEDERAL. INCOME TAXATION, 1063-74 (1972). In Corn Products
Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955), the Supreme Court held that the gains and losses
incurred by a manufacturer ()Icon) products from its purchase and sale acorn futures gave rise to
ordinary income and losses, rather than capital gains and losses, because the purchases and sales
constituted "an integral part of its manufacturing business," ht. at 51, rather than - transactions in
property which are not die normal source of business income." Id. at 52. Asa result of the Supreme
Court's decision in Corn Products, the general rule that capital stock held by a corporation constitutes
a capital asset and, consequently, generates capital gains or losses nn sale or other disposition, has
been qualified in various circumstances in which stock is bought and kept not For investment
purposes, but only as an incident to the conduct of the taxpayer's business. J. Hellerstein, Allocation
and Apportionment, sllPla note 184, at 159
-60.
1 " Greene, s'upra note 182, at 801.
'" See, e.g., Woolworth 102 S. Ct. at 3135; ASARCO 102 S. Ct. at 3109.
1 " 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
189
 j. Hellerstein, Allocation mud Apportionment, supra 110112 [84, at 156.
"" 441 U.S. at 414.
I"' 411 U.S. at 436
- 37.
:I'2
"" Id. at 437. Property present in California on March first of any year is subject toad valorem
property tax. CAI.. REV. gc 'l'sx CODE §§ 117, 405, 2192 (West 1970 & Supp. 1983). In Japan Line,
California taxed all the containers actually present in Los Angeles on ally March first ern their entire
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Angeles could not impose such a tax. 1 " 4
The Court. distinguished cases involving international commerce from cases involv-
ing domestic interstate commerce only."' In the latter situation, the Court noted that it
need only address the minimal nexus, fair apportionment and nondiscrimination ques-
tions.'" In the former case, however, the Court stated that two additional standards are
important in determining the validity of a state's action.'" In the japan Line decision, the
Court. first examined whet her the tax, notwithstanding apportionment, created a substan-
tial risk of international multiple taxation.'" Second, the Court considered whether the
tax prevented the federal government from "speaking with one voice- when regulating
commercial relations withliforeigit countries.'" The Court stated that the risk or double
taxation in the international context is more serious than in the domestic context, because
of the absence of an authoritative tribunal capable of ensuring the cumulative tax burden
is computed on no more than one full value, when one of the taxing authorities is a
foreign sovereign.'" The Court also reasoned that the impairment of federal uniformity
on matters of foreign commerce may give rise to international disputes and lead foreign
nations disadvantaged by the levy to retaliate against American-owned businesses operat-
ing in those countries..•'
Although japan Line created additional constraints on state division-of-income rules
dealing with multinational firms, the holding was expressly limited to the taxation of
foreign-owned instrumentalities used exclusively in international commerce."' The
Court did not consider the constitutionality of a state tax on foreign-owned instrumen-
talities used in interstate commerce or domestically-owned instrumentalities used in
international commerce.'"
value, as if those same containers were present in the state for the whole year. 441 U.S. at 437. Each
container actually remained in California only for an average of three weeks out of every year for
loading, unloading, repair, and transit to final destination. Id. at 436-37. While any particular
Japanese container was presentt only temporarily in California, a thirfy constant number of contain-
ers occupied space on wharves and in warehouses in Los Angeles throughout the year. Id. Since the
number of containers actually within the state on March first approximated the average number of
containers within the state on any random dine, this "average presence tax'' was approximately the
same as if each container entering California during the year were taxed at a value proportionate to
the fraction of the year it was actually present in the taxing jurisdiction. Id. at 437. See also Note,
Commerce Clanw Limits on Direct Taxation of Foreign Containers: japan Late, Ltd. v. County of Las A ngeles,
14 J. IN 't.. L. & Ecox. 153, 154 (1979).
" 4 441 U.S, at
195 Id. at 446.
19' Id. In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), involving a state tax on the sale
of intrastate transportation services for articles of interstate commerce, the Supreme Court held that
the commerce clause does not bar state taxation of instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Id. at
277. The Court applied a four pronged test under the domestic commerce clause, under which it
looks at whether: (I) the activity taxed has a sufficient nexus with the taxing state: (2) the tax is
non-discriminatory with regard to interstate commerce: (3) the tax is fairly apportioned; and (4) the
tax is related to the benefits and protection provided by the taxing state. Id. at 279.
1 " 7 441 U.S. at 446.
190 id .
199 Id. at 448. See Michelin Tire Corp, v. Wages. 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976).
"" 441 U.S. at 447.
2"
 hi. at 449-50.
202 Id. at 4-15-46, 446 nra.9 & 10.
" 3 Id. at 444 n.7.
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4. The Status of the Law Prior to Container
In the Mobil and Exxon decisions, the Court reaffirmed the unitary business concept
as the basis and prerequisite for formula apportionment. 2 U" in the ASARCO and Wool-
worth decisions, the Court held that actual integration and control are the tests of a unitary
business.'" In Japan Line, the Court held that multiple taxation and federal unilbrmity
are additional concerns when unitary taxation affects international commerce.l 0 " After
these cases, the constitutional requirements for state unitary taxation of multijurisdic-
tional enterprises were fairly well settled, at least for United States corporations involved
in domestic interstate commerce. Unitary taxation by the states of multinational enter-
prises, whether based in the United States or abroad, doing business in the United States,
either directly or through subsidiaries and affiliates, was the next logical area of expan-
sion for state division-of-income rules.
II. THE Container DECISION: WORLDWIDE UNITARY TAXATION OF MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATE INCOME UPHELD
In Container Corporation of America v. Franchise 'lax Board 297
 the Supreme Court
confronted the issue of worldwide unitary taxation by a state of a multinational enter-
prise. Container was a United States corporation with several foreign subsidiaries operat-
ing abroad,'" All the subsidiaries were engaged in the same line of business as Container
and entertained a variety of working relationships with the parent company.'" The
Supreme Court upheld California's worldwide unitary tax and combined formula appor-
tionment as applied to a United States-based multinational enterprise. 210
A. The Majority Opinion
In the first part of the opinion, the Court reviewed briefly the constitutional stan-
dards applicable to state taxation of multijurisdictional entities. First, after reaffirming the
constitutional prohibition against extraterritorial taxation by the states,'" the Court
stated that the due process and commerce clauses of the Constitution require a "minimal
connection" between the interstate activities of the taxpayer and the taxing state, as well as
a "rational relationship" between the income attributed to the state and the intrastate
values of the enterprise. 2 t 2 The Court reaffirmed the principle that the burden is on the
taxpayer to show by clear and cogent evidence that there was extraterritorial taxation.'"
After briefly reviewing the conceptual differences between separate accounting, either
2" See supw notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
269 See supra notes 158-61, 171-76 and accompanying text.
"6 See supra notes 195.201 and accompanying text.
207 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983), reh'g denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. October 10, 1983).
2" See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
2"5 See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
210 103 S. Ci. at 2950, 2954-55.
211
	 at 2939.
212 Id. at 2940. The Court noted that these standards at least require that the in-state and
out-of-sune activities of the taxpayer constitute a unitary business and that they share or exchange
values not capable of precise identification or measurement. Id.
I" Id. at 2939-40.
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geographical or functional, and the unitary approaches:211 the Court noted that there are
numerous variations of the unitary business principle consistent with these constitutional
requirements. 213 One such variation, the Court said, is combined reporting of affiliated
groups of corporations 2 " whose application to multinational conglomerates, like Con-
tainer Corporation of America, was at issue in this case. 217 Second, the Court real firmed
that under both the due process and commerce clauses an apportionment formula must
be lair. 2 " Third, the Court restated that under the commerce clause an apportionment
fOrmula must not result. in discrimination against either interstate or foreign coin-
merce. 21 "
The first issue to be considered by the Court was the unitary character of Container
and its subsidiaries. 220 'the Court, however, was unwilling to take an active role in
deciding this issue for fear of spawning a great deal of further litigation on the intricate
factual issues relating to unitariness."' Consequently, the Court stated that it will,
whenever reasonably possible, defer to the state courts' determinations of the unitary
character of an enterprise, so long as they are "within the realm of permissible judge-
ment." 2 " According to the Court, it is the sole responsibility of the federal government,
not of the United States Supreme Court, to achieve unifbrmity in the definition of a
unitary business."'
In reviewing the lower court's finding that Container and its subsidiaries constitute a
unitary business, the Supreme Court, unlike the California Court of Appeals below,224 did
not refer to any of the formalized tests of unitary business, such as the "three-unities
test -223 or the "contribution and dependence test." 226 Instead, the Court. chose to rely'
2 " Id. at 2940. The Court appeared to favor the .state's use of the latter approach by noting that
"IMmal accounting is subject to manipulation and imprecision, and often ignores or captures
inadequately the many subtle awl largely unquantillable transfers of value that take place among the
components of a single enterprise," Id.
Id. at 2941.
21 " Id. See CAL. Rev. & TAN CODE; § 25102 (West 1979 & Supp. 1983).
217 103 S. Ct. at 2941-42. The Court was careful to point out that while a state might decide to
"respect formal corporate lines and treat the ownership of a corporate subsidiary as per se a passive
investment," this approach was 'not constitutionally required." Id. at 2941. In accepting combined
reporting as a permissible method, the Court quoted dicta from the Mobil case: "[sluperficially,
intercorporate division might appear to be an ... attractive basis for limiting apportionability. Rut
the form of business organization may have nothing to do with the underlying unity or diversity of
business enterprise." Id. (quoting Mobil Oil v. Comm'r of Taxes of Vermont, 445 U.S. 425, 440
(1980)). See supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
2 " 103 S. Ct. at 2942. The Court noted that there are two components of fairness: internal
consistency, which requires that the formula must be such that, if applied by every jurisdiction, it
would result in no more than all of the unitary business' income being taxed, and external consistency,
which requires that the factor or factors used in the apportionment formula actually reflect a
reasonable sense of how income is generated. Id.
7 " 103 S. Ct. at 2943.
220 Id. at 2945.
221 Id. at 2945 - 46.
222 Id .
222 Id. at 2956. See infra notes 356-57 and accompanying text.
22a
	 Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax lid., 117 Cal. App. 3d 988, 995, 1000, 173
Cal. Rptr. 121, 125, 129 (Ct. App. 1981).
225 For a detailed discussion of the three unities test, see supra, notes 84-86 and accompanying
text,
226 For a detailed discu.ssion of the contribution and dependence test seesupra, notes 87-88 and
accompanying text.
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on a series of factors contained in the record and concluded that all such factors "taken in
combination" were sufficient to support the lower court's finding of a unitary business.'
The Court explicitly refused to decide whether any particular factor would be sufficient
or conclusive in determining whether the taxpayer's business is unitary,'"
One of the factors considered by the Court was that Container Corporation and its
subsidiaries were engaged in the same line of business. 229 Like the Court below,^ 3 " the
Supreme Court endorsed the "administrative presumption" that corporations engaged in
the same line of business are unitary, at least as long as this presumption is only one
element among many in a court's finding of a unitary enterprise and its use is reasonably
limited. 2 " 1 The Court declined to set out any bright-line test of unitariness. In particular,
the Court refused to follow the suggestion of a leading scholar' in requiring a substan-
tial flow of goods among the component parts of it mercantile or manu facturing enter-
prise as a prerequisite to a finding of a unitary business. 233 The Court reasoned that
unitariness is predicated upon a "flow of value, riot a flow of goods," as evidenced by
functional integration, centralization of management, and economies of scale. 234
Alter finding that the lower court's determination of the unitary character of Con-
tainer was within the realm of permissible judgment, 235 the Court addressed the issue of
lair apportionment.. The Court. held that Container failed to sustain the burden of
proving that the income attributed to California bore "no rational relationship to the
in-state values" of the firm, and was "out of all appropriate proportion to the business
transacted" there.'"' Container challenged formula apportionment on two factually and
theoretically related grounds."' The first ground was that its foreign subsidiaries were
significantly [Imre profitable than its domestic operations, so that apportionment by
formula systematically distorted the true allocation of income between Container and its
227 103 S. Ct. at 2948. The factors considered by the Court included: Container's assistance to its
foreign subsidiaries in obtaining used and new equipment and in filling personnel needs; Container's
substantial role in loaning funds to the subsidiaries and guaranteeing loans provided by others; the
"considerable interplay" between Container and the subsidiaries in the area of corporate expansion;
Container's technical assistance to its subsidiaries; and the supervisory role played by Container's
officers in providing general guidance to the subsidiaries. Id. at 2947 -
3" Id. at 2948.
229 Id. at 2947.
230 Container Corp. of America .v. Franchise Tax Bd., 117 Cal. App. 3d 988, 1000, 173 Cal. Rptr.
121, 129 (Ct. App. 1981). Based on the administrative regulations implementing the California tax
statute, CALIFORNIA ADMINISTRAT]VE: CODE, title 18, Section 25120(6), the California Court of
Appeals noted that "a strong inference of a unitary business exists where the taxpayer is engaged in
the same type of business as its subsidiaries, - Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 117
Cal. App. 3d 988, 1000, 173 Cal. Rptr. 121, 129 (Ct. App. 1981). The Court showed great deference
for this administrative construction of the California tax laws. Id.
231 103 S. Ct. at 2947. The Court noted that investment in affiliates engaged in a business truly
distinct from I he taxpayer's main line of' business often serves the primary function of diversifying
the corporate port fOlio and reducing the risks inherent in being tied to one industry's business cycle.
Id. When, however, a corporation invests in a subsidiary engaged in the same line of work as itself',
the Court believes its purpose is typically increased efficiency and profitability through economies of
scale, operational integration and sharing of expertise. Id.
232 J.
	Recent Developments, supra note 3, at 501-02.
2 " 103 S. Ct. at 2947 and n.17-
23a Id. at 2947.
235 Id. at 2948.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 2948
-49.
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subsidiaries.' Container's second ground for objecting to formula apportionment was
that the costs of production in foreign countries were generally significantly lower than in
the United States, primarily as a result of the lower wage rates abroad, and that, because
wages are one of the three factors in the formula, apportionment unfairly inflated the
amount of income attributed to California, where wages are higher. 25 " The Court found
these arguments unpersuasive and upheld CaMin -Ma's use of formula apportionment."'
The Court did not set out to show that these arguments were unsupported by the
evidence produced."' The Court, instead, pointed out that even if the taxpayer's com-
plaints against the distortions caused by unitary taxation were verified in reality, it would
not automatically follow that the taxpayer should prevail. 242 The Court in fact acknowl-
edged that both separate geographical accounting and formula apportionment are "im-
perfect proxies for an ideal which is not only difficult to achieve in practice, but also
difficult to describe in theory." 243 Perfect accuracy is not to be expected regardless of what
approach is adopted. Accordingly, the Court did not maintain that the use of a three-
factor formula is an absolute guarantee against distortive effects."' The Court noted,
however, that the three-factor formula has been widely adopted by the states, including
California, because the elements that it takes into account — payroll, property, and sales
— appear, in combination, to reflect most of the factors by which value is generated. 2"
Consequently, while the Court implied that Container's evidence as to relative profitabil-
ity and disparate costs of production might he sufficient to substantiate Container's
complaints, such evidence did not in fact demonstrate the gross distortions in the amount.
of income au ributed to California, that arc necessary to strike down unitary taxation in
any particular case. 2 i 6 More importantly, however, the Court stated that even if Con-
tainer's complaints accurately reflected reality, they would not in theory impeach the
rationale underlying formula apporticminent. 247
Although the Court found California's method of taxation in and of itself' proper and
fair, the Court admitted that the method used by California is quite different from that
employed by the federal government and the vast majority of foreign nations."' The
internationally recognized approach to income taxation of multijurisdictional enterprises
is a version of the separate accounting approach, often called the ann's length standard. "0
Under the arm's length standard, each corporation, even if closely related to other
corporations within an affiliated group, is treated as a separate entity. 25" If, the Court
indicated, intra-group transactions differ from arm's length transactions, then an adjust-
23" N. at 2948.
229 Id. at 2949.
240 Id
2-11 a
242 Id
242
244 Id .
245 Id.
240 Id. at 2949-50. The Court found that the difference in the amount of income taxable by
California as computed by Container from that computed by state authorities was 14 percent, "a
figure certainly within the substantial margin of error inherent in any method of attributing income
among the components of a unitary business." Id, at 2950.
247 Id. at 2949. See infra notes 326-30 and accompanying text..
2i"
	 at 2950.
240 Id.
250 Id.
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meat is required in order to reallocate income among related taxpayers. 25 ' The Court
stated that. for federal income tax purposes, the arm's length approach is articulated in
section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code. 252
California's departure from the internationally accepted method of taxation raised a
constitutional issue because of Container's multinational character. The Court noted that
if Container's unitary enterprise were entirely domestic, the application of different
methods of taxation in different states would raise no commerce clause issue. 25" Given the
firm's multinational character, however, the Court stated that its inquiry under the foreign
commerce clause must be more searching than in the case of a domestic multistate
corporation. 2 " Under the standards developed by the Supreme Court in Japan Line, 255
the Court looked at whether California's worldwide unitary tax (I) created a substantial
risk of multiple taxation; and (2) impaired federal uniformity in an area where federal
uniformity is essential, 256
In applying these standards, the Coon admitted that the Container case was similar to
Japan Line in that there was proof of actual double taxation, stemming from California's
adoption of a method of taxation different from and inconsistent with that adopted by the
federal government and accepted by the international community. 257
Nevertheless the Court. distinguished Japan Line from Container on three grounds.
First, Container involved a tax on income, rather than on property.'" Second, the double
taxation in Container, although real, was not the "inevitable" result of the California taxing
scheme. 2" The occurrence of multiple taxation depended solely on the facts of the
particular case.'" Third, the tax in Container fell on a corporation domiciled and head-
quartered in the United States, rather than on the foreign owners of an instrumentality of
foreign cornmeree. 261 Because japan Line specifically excepted from its holding the case of
2" Id. at 2953. The Court recognized that under the arm's length approach, transactions
among related corporations are closely scrutinized to avoid income shifting. Id. I ntragroup transfer
prices for goods and services are equated to the price levels that would result among unrelated
parties dealing at arm's length in comparable situations, products, and markets. Id. The Conn noted
that the rationale behind the arm's length approach is that, for a variety of reasons, businesses
sharing a common economic interest, typically a parent corporation and its subsidiaries, often find it
advantageous to engage in transactions on terms different from those which would result if either
party were dealing with an unrelated person. Id.
252 y . at 2953. I.R.C. § 482 (1983) provides that:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not
incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not
affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary
may distribute, apportion. or allocate gross income, deductions, credits or allowances
between or among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he determines that such
distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of
taxes or clearly to reflect the income ( -Warty asuch organizations, trades or businesses.
255 103 S. CI. at 2950. Elsewhere in the opinion, die majority noted that in the interstate
commerce context the commerce clause has not in practice required much more than lair appor-
tionment. Id. at 2943.
25 ' Id. at 2950.
2 " For a discussion titjapail Line, see supra notes 188-203 and accompanying text.
25" 1113 S. Cm. at 2951.
2" Id. at 2951-52.
259 /d. at 2952.
259
21'" Id. On this point the disagreement between tlte majority and the dissenters is at its maxi-
mum. For a detailed analysis, see mire notes 331-39 and accompanying text.
z"' 103 S. Ct. at 2952.
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domestically owned instrumentalities engaged in foreign commerce,262
 the Court did not
have to narrow or overrule that case in deciding Container"' Based on the facts before it,
the Court expressly refused to decide whether worldwide combined apportionment as
applied by a state to a domestic corporation with foreign parents or to foreign corpora-
tions with either foreign parents or foreign subsidiaries is constitutional."'
In analyzing the issue of double taxation, the Court pointed out that, although even a
slight overlapping of tax in the international context raises a constitutional issue, there is
no "absolute prohibition" on state-induced multiple taxation. 265 A state tax, the Court
stated, must be looked at in its context and in light of the alternatives reasonably available
to the taxing state.'" In the Container situation, the Court noted, there was no alternative
available to California that would assure elimination or even amelioration of the double
taxation problem, short of the state's foregoing any lax on Container's income.'" The
Court said that even if California were to adopt some version of the arm's length
standard, there would be no guarantee that the international double taxation problem
would be eliminated. 26 " This is clue to the likelihood of substantial differences in the
precise rules whereby the various national jurisdictions implement such a standard.'"
Having resolved that no undue risk of multiple taxation was involved in the case, the
Court confronted the issue of whether California's worldwide unitary tax impaired
federal uniformity.'" The Court stated that when a state tax implicates foreign affairs, it
must be held unconstitutional if' it either implicates matters of foreign policy within the
exclusive power of the federal government or violates a clear federal directive.'"
Under the first prong of the above test — whether the California tax implicated
foreign policy — the Court considered the risk that worldwide unitary taxation would
offend United States foreign trading partners and lead them to retaliate against the
nation as a whole.'" The Court, however, was reluctant to engage in a factual investiga-
tion or a balancing between the risk of retaliation and the freedom of the states.'"
Foreign policy, the Court stated, is the province of the Executive Branch and of Con-
gress.'" In accord with this position, the Court took notice of the Administration's
262 Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, at 444 n.7 (1979).
2" 103 S. Ct. at 2952.
261 Id. at 2952 n.26.
26y
	 at 2953. The Court stated that "a problem that !night be deemed de minimis in a domestic
context ... assumes importance when sensitive matters of foreign relations and national sovereignty
are concerned." Id. (quoting japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 456 (1979)).
266 103 S. Ct. at 2953.
" 7 Id.
266
	 at 2954.
259 Id. The Court concluded that "in the absence of a central coordinating authority, absolute
consistency, even among taxing authorities whose basic approach to [division of income among
various taxing jurisdictions] is quite similar, may just be too much to ask . ." Id., and that therefore
"it would be perverse ... to require California to give up one allocation method that sometimes
results in double taxation in favor of another allocation method that also sometimes results in double
taxation." Id. at 2954-55.
2" Id. at 2955.
27 ' Id.
272 Id.
279
	 In the absence of explicit congressional action and given its unwillingness to make policy
judgments, the Court noted it was left with "objective standards" and "general observations" regard-
ing the imperatives of international law and economics. Id.
2" Id. at 2956.
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decision not to file an antic -us curiae brief in opposition to the state tax." The Court
considered the Executive Branch's unwillingness to take a strong position on the issues of
this case as at least some indication that the foreign policy of the United States was not
"seriously threatened" by California's action.'
The Court indicated that foreign retaliation against the United States was both
unlikely and inapposite because in Container the "legal incidence" of the state tax fell on a
domestic corporation, rather than on a foreign entity, even though, in a sense, California
reached for foreign income."' Because Container Corp. was "in one way or another"
taxable in California, the Court reasoned, foreign nations had no reason to retaliate, no
matter how theoretically objectionable they might find California's approach."
Considering the second prong of its test — whether the California tax violated
federal law — the Court was unable to find any specific indication of Congressional intent
contrary to California's practice. 27" The Court concluded that neither the federal tax
statutes nor the network of tax treaties to which the federal government was a party
provided the necessary pre-emptive force:28° The Court found that although many
treaties require the federal government to adopt the arm's length approach in taxing
domestic income of multinational enterprises, that requirement is normally waived with
respect to the taxes imposed by the signatory nations on their own domestic corpora-
tions. 281 Moreover, all such treaties exempt the taxing activity of "sub-national gov-
ernmental units" such as the states:2 " As to congressional legislation in the held of state
275 Id. The Court was careful to point out that "the lack of such a submission was by no means
dispositive." Id. The Court, however, noted that the Solicitor General had submitted a brief opposing
worldwide formula apportionment in Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Lenckes, 84 Ill. 2d 102, 417 N.E. 2d
1343 (1981), appeal dismissed, sub. now. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 51
U.S.L.W. 3937 (1983). 103 S. Ct. at 2956 u_33. In Container the Court stated that "although there
[was] no need for us to speculate as to the reasons for the Solicitor General's decision not to submit a
similar brief in the [Container case], . . . there [was] no indication that the position taken by the
government in Chicago Bridge & Iron still represent[ed] its views...." Id. Chicago Bridge & Iron
involved issues almost identical to Container and was pending before the Supreme Court at the same
time as Container. There the taxpayer sought to he treated as a worldwide unitary business to offset
in-state profits with out-of-state and foreign losses. Caterpillar' Tractor Co. v. Lenkes, 84 111. 2d 102,
107 -08, 417 N.E. 2d 1343, 1347 (1981). The state disagreed and a number of corporations inter-
vened to oppose use of worldwide combined formula apportionment. Id. at 112, 417 N.E. 2d at 1349.
Following the Container decision, Chicago Bridge & Iron was dismissed for want of a substantial federal
question. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 51 U.S.L.W. 3937 (1983).
' 103 S. Ct. at 2956.
277 Id. at 2955 -56. The majority called attention to Container Corpration's status as a United
States company twice in the opinion. See supra note 56 anti accompanying text.
27" Id. at 2956. To make its IaMit dearer, the Court 'mimed out that the amount of tax a
domestic corporation pays in California is "notch more the function of California's tax rate than of its
allocation method. - Id. Therefore, the Court believed foreign nations have no more reason to
retaliate if a state adopts worldwide combined apportionment than if it raises its general tax rate to
achieve the same. economic result. Id. In both cases, the Court maintained, foreign nations [night at
best complain of an "attenuated, - non-injurious offense. Id.
279 Id.
2,10
"' M. (citing UNITEn Sn'a'res DRAFT Monet. INCOME TAX TREATY, art. 7(2) & 1(3) (Tune 16,
[981), reprinted in TAX TREATIES (I'41) 1022 [hereinafter cited as Model Treaty]).
29 i 103 S. Ct. at 2956. In its opinion the Court referred to t he only proposal ever made to insert
in a tax treaty a provision limiting the states' freedom to depart from the arm's length standard,
which did not receive the consent of the Senate. Id. For details of the proposed treaty provision, see
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taxation of multijurisclictional corporations, the Court recognized the long history of
proposals, bills and debates, but noted that so Car Congress had failed to enact any
legislation addressing t he problem.'•
In sum, the Court concluded that the California lax authorities' treatment. of Con-
tainer Corporation violated neither the due process clause nor the commerce clause or the
Constitution, under the standards developed in Mobil and its progeny. In particular, the
Court held that the additional tests developed by the Court in Japan Line for the states'
unitary taxation of multinational enterprises were satisfied in the Container case and the
foreign commerce clause was not violated.
B. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Powell, joined in his dissent by Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor,
did not address the issues of unitariness and fair apportionment, but limited his opinion
to the foreign commerce aspects of the Container case," 1 'the dissenters found japan Line
controlling and would, t herefore, have held California's unitary tax unconstitutional."'
Justice writing for the dissent, stated that actual double taxation inevitably
resulted front CalilOrnia's use of an allocation method fundamentally inconsistent with
the internationally recognized method.'" The dissent maintained that formula appor-
tionment systematically inflated the amount of income taxable in California."' Because
California's formula takes into account payroll, property and sales, it allocates a higher
proportion of income to jurisdictions where wage rates, property values and sales prices
are higher.'" The amount of income allocated by Itmnula has no necessary relationship
to the amount calculated under the arm's length method.'" The dissenters stated that as
long as the three factors of the formula remained higher in California, that stale would
inevitably tax income under its formula that had already been taxed by another country
under accepted international practice and double taxation would result.'" In the dissent-
Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and
the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, 94th Cong„ 2d
Sess., art. 9(4) (1976); Protocol to the Convention, 940i Cong„ 2d Sess. (1976): Second Protocol to
the Convention, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in 2 TAX TREATIES (P-H) 89,039,11 89,061, 4J
89,063. The Senate withheld its consent from the portion or the treaty limiting state tax power in part
on the ground that if such limitations should be effected at all, they should be effected through the
traditional legislative process, rather than by treaty. See State Taxation of Foreign Source Income: Hearing
on H.R. 5076 Before the Howe Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 239-90 (1980). Proposed
article 9(4) of the Treaty would have prohibited unitary business treatment by a state of a United
Kingdom parent corporation and its United States subsidiaries for purposes of worldwide formula
apportionment. 103 S. Ct. at 2956.
" 7 hl. at 2956.
2" ht. at 2957 (Powell, j., dissenting).
205
 Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
2
" ti Id. at 2957 -58. 2959 (Powell, J., dissenting).
207 Id. at 2958 (Powell, J., dissenting).
"" Id. (Powell, j., dissenting).
209 Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
2" ld. (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell supported this view on the record. Id. Since wage
rates, property values and sales prices were lower in Latin America, where the overwhelming
majority of Container's foreign income was earned, California, where all three factors were higher,
would inevitably tax under its liwmula income that had already been taxed by another country tinder
the arm's length standard. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting),
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er's view, the foreign commerce clause mandates that California adopt some version of
the arm's length stainlard. 2 " The dissent conceded that even if California were to do so,
double taxation could still exist through technical differences in the application of a
similar approach. Justice Powell, however, maintained that this kind of duplicative tax-
ation is presently tolerated under international practice because the occurrences of
double taxation would most likely cancel out over time. 2 " 2 Moreover, disagreements in the
implementation of a compatible standard are more likely to be resolved by international
negotiation, according to the dissenters.'"
Justice Powell was also critical of the Court's distinction between United Stales based
and foreign based multinationals:2" First, the dissent argued that although the taxpayer
in Container was technically a domestic corporation, California was taxing the income of
the foreign subsidiaries, (hereby giving foreign nations legitimate grounds to complain
that California was in reality taxing income earned outside its borders."'" Moreover, the
dissenters predicted that difficult questions would be presented if a state in the United
States attempted to tax the American subsidiary of it foreign parent company on the basis
of the parent's worldwide income.'""'' justice Powell observed that most of the Court's
analysis would be inapplicable to such a case."' According to the dissent, the United
States/foreign parent dichotomy is an issue which Congress must address." 8
The dissenters also disagreed with the Court's reliance on the federal government's
decision not to file an (miens curiae brief in opposition to the state tax.'" The dissent
considered the Solicitor General's memorandum in Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co.,' a case filed before Container, but pending before the Supreme Court at the
same time, which involved issues almost identical to the Container case, applicable to this
latter case as wel1. 3"
The dissenters concluded that the Container case did not satisfy the requirements of
the foreign commerce clause, as developed in Japan Line and therefore did not address
the due process aspects of the case. The dissent was most critical of the Court's attempt to
draw a distinction between the case of a United States based multinational with foreign
subsidiaries and the case of a foreign parent company With United States subsidiaries and
affiliates.
29 Id. at 2957-58 (Powell, J., dissenting).
292 I	 • •)„,Id. ( Powell,, J., dissenting). Justice Powell rioted that there is no reason why conflicts in the
specific rules of income allocation among different nations should "consistently favor one jurisdiction
over another." Id.
293
	 at 2959 (Powell, J., dissenting).
29' Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
255 Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
2." Id. at 2959-60 (Powell, J., dissenting).
297 Id. at 2960 (Powell, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that in such a case retaliation on the
part of the parent's government might be expected, so that, under the Court's test, the state tax
would have to be held unconstitutional. Id. This outcome, however, would he unjustifiable and
unacceptable to the extent that "it would leave California free to discriminate against a Delaware
corporation in favor of an overseas corporation." Id.
2" Id. (Powell. J., dissenting).
299 Id. (Powell, J., dissenting). See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
"" Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Lenckes, 84 111. 2d 102, 417 N.E.2d 1343 (1981), appeal dismissed
sub nom, Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 51 U.S.L.W. 3937 (1983). For a
detailed analysis of this case and the Solicitor General's brief, ,see supra note 246.
3" 103 S. Ct. at 2960 (Powell, J., dissenting). While Justice Powell recognized that the govern-
ment's position, might have changed between the nine when the Chicago Bridge & Iron brief was filed
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III. THE Container DECISION: SOUND CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEDENT OR COURT'S
SHOWING OF POLITICAL WISDOM?
In Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax Board, the Supreme Court ap-
proved a state's scheme of worldwide unitary taxation. The decision is best analyzed
through its two theoretically distinct components: (1) the due process discussion of the
unitary business concept and fair apportionment ;" 2 and (2) the foreign commerce
portion, dealing with international double taxation federal uniformity. 303
 Although the
first portion of the opinion is merely a development of recent Supreme Court precedent
and a consistent application of fairly settled doctrine, the second part addresses more
novel issues and is, thus, far more controversial. Commentators who have consistently
criticized the Court's tolerance of state division-of-income rules 304 are more likely to agree
that the Container decision is the latest embodiment of an "overbroad grant of discretion"
to the slates, promoting "inhibitive uncertainty" for multistate and multinational enter-
prises." 0$ Criticism of this kind is likely to be even more widespread because Container
signals a retreat from the attitude of judicial vigilance shown by the Court in the ASARCO
and Woolworth decisions,'
This section will first discuss the Court's position on the unitary business concept in
Container in light of the views and proposals of leading commentators. The particular
aspects of the issue of fair apportionment in the case of multinational firms will then be
explored. Finally, this section will analyze the Court's treatment of the issue of double
taxation and the problems involved in the Court's distinction between United States based
and foreign based multinationals.
A. Unitary Business Concept
The Supreme Court's discussion of the unitary business concept in Container is likely
to be a prime target for criticism. In finding that the core of a unitary enterprise is a "How
of value not a flow of goods,"" 7 the Court refused to set up a "bright-line test" of
unitariness. One leading scholar has long proposed a "basic operations interdependence"
test that would find an enterprise unitary only if' it carried on integrated operating
functions.' According to this proposal, the nonoperating functions of a business, such as
and the time when Container was argued, the former case was still pending when the latter was
decided and he believed the Court should have taken the government's arguments into consider-
ation. Id.
3 " See supra, notes 220-47 and accompanying text.
303 See supra, notes 248-83 and accompanying text.
304 See, e.g., W. Hellerstein, Stale Income Taxation, supra note 3, at 422-23; J. Hellerstein, Recent
Developments, supra note 3, at 502 -03.
305 See WhiteNack, State Tax Litigation After the Container Decision, 20 TAX NOTES 771, 775-77
(Sept. 5, 1983) [hereinafter cited as WhiteNack].
3 " See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
307 Container, 103 S. Ct. at 2947. See supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
3 ° 8
 J. Hellerstein, Allocation and Apportionment, supra note 184, at 165. In the author's own words:
"a business is not unitary unless interdependent basic operations are carried on to a substantial extent
in different states by the branches or subsidiaries that comprise the controlled enterprise." Id.
Examples of basic operating functions are: manufacturing in one state and selling in another; buying in
one state and selling in another; processing goods or assembling products in one state and transport-
ing them elsewhere. Id. Since interdependent operating functions necessarily imply a flow of goods
among different components of a unitary business, this proposed test is nothing but (he "flow of
goods" test by another name. McLure, The Basic Operational Interdependence Test of a Unitary Business. - A
Rejoinder, 20 TAN NOTES 91, 96 (Oct. 10, 1983) [hereinafter cited as McLure, A Rejoinder!.
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centralized management, accounting, personnel management, legal and similar services,
centralized advertising, pension and benefit plans or the furnishing of capital, should not
make a business unitary.""" Because the cost of centralized nonoperating functions can be
specyically allocated to the various components of an enterprise through established ac-
counting procedures, there is arguably no reason to use formula apportionment in such a
case.'" Critics of this proposed "bright-line test" point to the intra-group economic
profits generated by centralized management and services, which make it inherently
impossible to divide income between affiliated firms."" Two typical situations support this
latter view. The first is when demand for the similar products of two affiliated firms is
highly interdependent."" In such a case, centralized management is in a position to
maximize group profits and allocate net income to one or the other of the affiliated firms,
even without any flow of products or services between them.''" The second situation is
when there are transfers of technical expertise, know-how, managerial and organizational
skills and good will, including brand loyally."' hi such circumstances, it is impossible to
price the constant flow of proprietary and highly specialized information or to allocate the
profits generated by separate activities drawing on a "common - pool of technology."" 3
Commentators and practitioners have long advocated a certain and simple test of a
unitary business.'" While sonic point to the flow of goods/basic operational interdepen-
dence test the proper solution,"'' others argue that the identification and definition of
"basic operations - is hardly more workable than the "flow of value" test."" Although the
3"' McLure...4 Rejoinder, supra note 308, at 96. See also J. Hellerst ein, Allocation and Apportionment,
supra note 189, at 165; J. Hellerstein, The Basic Operations Interdependence Requirement of a Unitary
Business: A Reply to Charles E. McLure, Jr., 18 TAX Noms 723, 728 (Feb. 28, 1983) [hereinafter cited as
J. Hellerstein, A Reply]
"" J. Hellerstein, Allocation and Apportionment, supra note 184, at 165; J. Hellerstein, A Reply,
supra note 309, at 728. It has been pointed out, however, that the quantification, aggregation, and
specific allocation of intra-group relationships and centralized services is likely to he more difficult
and burdensome than formula apportionment. Mcf,ure, A Rejoinder, supra note 308, at 96. Since the
main purpose of ;my "bright line lest" is simplification and the saving of resources, it has been
suggested that there may be a very serious flaw in this proposal. Id.
McLure, Operational Interdependence is not the Appropriate "Bright Line Test" of a Unitary' Busi-
ness — At Least, Not Now, 18 "FAX NOTES 107, 108 (Jan. 10, 1983) [hereinafter cited as McLure,
Operational Interdependence]; McLure, A Rejoinder, supra note 308, at 93. According to this view, the
need for formula apportionment does not stem from t he difficulty of spreading the costs of
centralized services, but rather from the impossibility of distributing t he benefits of increased overall
efficiency to the components of an integrated enterprise. Id.
"' McLure, Operational interdependence, supra note 311, at 108-09; McLure, A Rejoinder, supra
note 308, at 92-93.
:113 McLure, Operational Interdependence, supra note 311, at 108-09; McLure„4 Rejoinder, supra
note 308, at 92-93.
McLure, Operational Interdependence, supra note 311, at 109-10; Mc Lure, A Rejoinder, supra
note 308, at 94.
" 3 McLure, Operational Interdependence, saps note 311, ;it 109-10; McLure, A Rejoinder, supra.
note 308, at 94.
"" See, e.g., J. Hellerstein, A Reply, supra note 309, at 730. There Hellerstein stated: ''Broad,
vague tests of unitariness . . . have led not only to burdensome, time-consuming and expensive
compliance and administration, but also to severe distortion and ntisattribution of income.... What
[is needed] is a workable and equitable method of determining whether a business is unitary . .
without such inordinate expenditures of time and money." Id.
"" J. Hellerstein, Allocation and Apportionment, supra note 184, at 165.
McLure, A Rejoinder, supra note 308, at 96. J. Hellerstein, in A Reply, supra note 309, ;it 729,
concedes that "[like most legal distinctions, the line between [basic and non-basic operations] ... has
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Supreme Court in Container explicitly endorsed the "flow of value
- approach,'" the
controversy is far from moot, because individual states are free to adopt their own
standards and because Congress will undoubtedly be asked to embody one approach or
the other in uniform federal legislation."'"
B. Fair Apportionment
The taxpayer's argument that disparate costs of .
 product ion and rates of profitability
in different nations make formula apportionment unfair did not persuade the Container
Court."' The Court correctly recognized that the flaw in the taxpayer's argument was
theoretical, rather than factual. 3 " 2
 Even if' the taxpayer's evidence goes unchallenged, the
source of income principle"' is. irrelevant in determining the fairness of formula
apportionment."' I I the states resort to unitary apportionment. because separate account-
ing is out inappropriate method to allocate the tax base, it is difficult to justify the use of
separate accounting data to invalidate tine apportionment result when applied to a unitary
business. 3 ''" "Fhis use of logically inconsistent arguments bespeaks a misconception on the
part of the taxpayer concerning the foundations for unitary apportionment.
In light or these considerations, the Supreme Court appropriately found that Con-
tainer Corporation's argument that its foreign subsidiaries were more profitable than its
California operations was Faulty because this argument sought to undermine Formula
apportionment by showing that its results did not have a necessary relationship with the
source of taxable income."'" Moreover, the Court was consistent with its position in Mobil
in concluding-
 that. when profitability arises from the operation of the business as it whole,
its gray and fuzzy areas" and that what constitutes a basic operation in one industry may not he such
in others. Id. at 730.
'1111 Container, 103 S. Ct. in 2947.
211 " NicLure, A Thjoinder, supra note 308, at 91-92.
321
 103 S. Ct. at 2948 -49.
322
 103 S. Ct. at 2948-49.
".1
 The source principle, on which the separate accounting
-
 approach is based, says that income
should he taxed solely and entirely in the jurisdiction where it is actually generated." Hellerstein,
Allocation and Apportionment, snpra note 184, at 163. While the states mill consider the source principle
in their division-or-income rules, it is no longer their .vine concern. Id. at 163-64. Jr is widely
recognized today that the benefits mid protection afforded a multistate or multinational business and
the public costs incurred in furnishing public service, facilities and resources to the business also
ought 10 be taken into account in apportioning the tax base. Id. at iii t. The Supreme Court in
General Motors Corp. v. District Of Columbia, 380 U.S. 553, 561 (1965), said that 
- Dille standard
three-hit:ha formula can he justified as a rough, practical approximation of the distribution of either
a corporation's sources of income or the social costs which it generates.'' See also Housi. SPEcIAL.
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE TANATION or INTERSTATE COMMERCE. 1 Willis Committee Report, 158. 159,
14.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). In this report the committee stated:
[Al company's net income should he viewed only as a measure of the company's ability
to contribute to governmental costs and . • . once this .thility is established, the
contribution should he divided among the States without regard to how this ability was
obtained. Instead of locating income by its geographical source, the division-of-income
rule should measure the relative extent to which the company has caused the various
States to incur governmental costs.
Id,
j. Fiellersteht, Allocation and Apportionment, supra note 184, at 164.
Dexter, 77n• Unitary Concept, .mpm note 3, at 192.
Container, 103 S. Ct. at 2948-49.
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it is misleading to characterize the income of the business as having a single identifiable
"source.""" The same conclusions are true for the differences in costs of production,
property values, and sales prices. The unitary concept is not based on the assumption that
there must he uniformity of operating revenues and expenses among the various compo-
nents of the enterprise," 2" so that every dollar of payroll or property spent in a foreign
jurisdiction will produce approximately the same amount of income as a dollar of payroll
or property spent in the taxing state.' As the Court stated in Container, the justification
for apportioning the income of a unitary multinational enterprise is that California
payroll as well as foreign payroll goes into the production of any given product, whether
manufactured in California or abroad."""
C. International Double 7 -oration
The Court's reasoning on the issue of international double taxation is very refined,""
but at times it is so rarefied it becomes unconvincing. The dissenters' view"'" in this
respect is much stronger because it is summary and of immediate, if superficial, under-
standing. The Court concluded that whether the combination of California's worldwide
unitary tax and of a foreign nation's arm's length approach actually results in the same
income of a foreign subsidiary of a United States parent being taxed twice or in some
portion of income nut being taxed at all depends solely on the facts of the individual
cases."'" In purely abstract terms, the Court was correct. in its conclusion. In fact, assum-
ing that the foreign jurisdiction imposes corporate income tax, the actual occurrence of
double taxation depends both on the particular interplay between the two jurisdictions'
definitions of taxable income and on the foreign country's application, if any, of an
"adjustment" provision similar to section 482 of the I .R.C." 4 Double taxation would be as
possible, in theory, if both California and the foreign nation adopted some version (lithe
arm's length approach, as it would when California adopts unitary apportionment be-
cause the "crossing" of heterogeneous definitions of taxable income and/or inconsistent
3" See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of VerMont, 445 U.S. 425, 438 (1980). For an
enlightening illustration of this principle see J. Hellerstein, Allocation and Apportionment, supra note
184, at 164.
john Deere Plow Co. v. Franchise Tax Board, 38 Cal. 2d 214, 228, 238 P.2d 569, 576 (1951).
See also Dexter, The Unitary Concept, supra note 3, at 205-07.
3 " J. Hellerstein, Allocation and Apportionment, supra note 184, at 164. Hellerstein contends that
the problem with the taxpayer's argument is one of 'proof, namely that there are not sufficient factual
elements to adjust wage rates and property costs "for comparative productivity, country by country,
and the effects on unit costs of production of the greater use of modern sophisticated machinery in
developed as compared to developing countries." Id. at 164. In t h is view he is, however, mistaken.
The question is not whether, as a matter of fact, the existence of substantial disparities in the nominal
wage tales and property cost, when adjusted for comparative productivity, country by country, is
nevertheless such as to make the effective real cost of production so different as to cause apportion-
ment to result in severe distortion and misattribution of income. No matter how well supported by
the evidence the disparity in real costs per unit of production is, the source rule remains legally
irrelevant in determining the appropriateness of formula apportionment.
"" Container, 103 S. Ct. at 2949. In light of this statement contained in the text of the opinion, the
Court's notation in afivtnote that formula apportionment is based on "the assumption that rates of
return on property and payroll ... are roughly the same in different jurisdictions," id. at 2949-50
n.20, remains an enigma.
' 31  See supra notes 267-69 and accompanying text.
:32 See supra notes 287-93 and accompanying text.
''"" Container, 103 S. Ct. at 2952.
a" See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
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reallocations of income under section 482-type rules might still produce double taxation
or the same income. As a practical matter, however, the dissenters were correct in
pointing Out that multiple taxation is much less likely to occur when the two jorisdictions
involved have adopted homogeneous approaches."'" Furthermore, even if double taxa-
tion actually resulted in this latter case, it would be unlikely that the effects on tax
revenues would favor consistently and uniformly one jurisdiction over another and thus
its distortive effects would tend to balance out over time.'
The Court's opinion had the merit of pointing out that international double taxation
is not linked to any particular set of technical division-of-income rules, but that double
taxation arises whenever two taxing authorities assert overlapping jurisdiction over the
same taxable income and neither one provides the taxpayer compensatory relief for the
other's claim."'" The Court recognized that international double taxation is simply a
specific instance of unfair apportionment. Multiple taxation occurs whenever one or
more jurisdictions taxes, either intentionally or inadvertently, a share of the overall tax
base out of proportion with the benefits and protection afforded to and the public costs
incurred in furnishing government services to the multijurisdictional enterprise that
generated the income. Double taxation, therefore, is neithei- more nor less "inevitable - if
both jurisdictions adopt the arm's length standard than if one uses formula apportion-
ment. The disagreement between the majority and the dissent can be translated into the
difference between "inevitable" and "likely. - The majority concentrated on the theoretical
issues underlying the Container situation, while the dissent looked at the actual circum-
stances of the situation. 11' the correctness of logical deductions is the focus, the majority is
correct, if practical realities are the focus, the dissenters are correct.
The bottom line, as the Court said in Container, is that "allocating income among
various taxing jurisdictions bears some resemblance to slicing a shadow. -33s To the extent
that there is a "right" way of' dividing the tax base, the "right" result may be accomplished
equally well through formula apportionment as through the arm's length rule. Fair
apportionment is the result of political good will, rather than technical rules. Ultimately,
33 ' See supra notes 292-93 and accompanying text. Even the California tax authorities implicitly
conceded that this was a correct view by "not seriously disputing) the actual existence of double
taxation,- even though it was not conclusively demonstrated on the record. See Container, 103 S. Ct. at
2951-52 n.22. Container, in fact, did not produce the tax returns filed by its subsidiaries in their
foreign domiciles. Id. It was entirely flossible that deductions, exemptions, or adjustments available in
the foreign income tax systems eliminated any overlap in taxable income caused by California's
apportionment. Id.
3" Container, 103 S. Ct. at 2958-59 (Powell, J., dissenting). The possibility that conflicts between
the substantive section 482-type allocation rules applied by each of the taxing jurisdictions involved
may result in overlapping taxation has long been recognized. See Madere, International Pricing:
Allocation Guidelines and Relief frorn Double Taxation, 10 TEx. 1NT'r. 1_,J. 108, 109-10 (1975). Double
Taxation occurs, for example, when the United States federal government assesses a deficiency
against a United States parent based on income reallocated to it from its foreign subsidiary pursuant
to 1.R.C. section 482, and the subsidiary has already reported that same income to the foreign tax
authorities and paid taxes on it. Id. at 109. The subsidiary may, of course, try to obtain a correspond-
ing reduction of its tax liability in the foreign domicile. Id. at 109-10. Most countries, however, refuse
to grant a downward adjustment solely on the basis of the reallocation practices of a foreign
jurisdiction. Id. at 121. Moreover, it must. be noted that this kind of double taxation, contrary to the
kind present in the Container case, is nearly confiscatory, because the principle rate of corporate
income taxation at the national level is between forty and fifty percent in most industrial countries.
Id. at 110.
" 7 See generally Madere, supra note 336, at 122.
" 3 " Container, 103 S. Ct. at 2954.
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then, double taxation from whatever source has to he eliminated through international
negotiation and cooperation.""
D. The United StatesIForewn Parent Dichotomy
The Court's handling of the issue of foreign retaliation against California's
worldwide unitary tax centers on the United Staics/foreign parent dichotomy."'" What
motivated the Court to distinguish unitary taxation of a United States based multinational
from that of a lOreign based multinational was probably the fact. that the protests against
worldwide combined taxation submitted by several foreign countries to the federal
government dealt mostly with the case of a foreign parent with United States sub-
sidiaries."' One commentator has criticized the Court for choosing "not to dwell" on such
protests, taking the position that the Container decision presented an issue of "local rather
than international concern.'"'' Nevertheless, the Court's conclusion that foreign retalia-
tion against the California tax was unlikely is supported by the lindings of a study of the
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations."'" After a thorough investigation
triggered by the formal protests of several foreign governments. the Commission found
no evidence that state use of worldwide combination had caused harm to the nation."'
The study concluded that unitary taxation of multinational firms by the states did not
result in any cut-back in investment in the United States, any retaliatory taxation by
foreign governments of American corporations operating abroad, or any refusal by
foreign governments to conclude tax treaties with the United States government.'
rthermore, because the Court considered the issue in Container as one involving merely
the local corporate income tax on a domestic taxpayer, in the Court's view, foreign
countries were really complaining of excessive taxation indirectly affecting economic
""" The proof that no system of taxation of multi-jurisdictional taxpayers contains any magic
self-correcting feature against. double taxation is that modern tax conventions invariably provide I'm
- mutual agreement procedures," authorizing bilateral negotiations directly between the competent
tax authorities of the signatory countries in order to remedy double taxation on a case-by-case basis.
Madere, International Pricing, supra note 336, at 124.
34 ° See supra notes 277-78 and accompanying text,
WhiteNack, supra note 305, at 780. Several foreign nations, including Canada, France, the
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the European Economic Community, and Japan, protested
against the worldwide unitary tax, through anici curiae briefs filed in the Container and Chicago Bridge
& Iron cases. Container, 103 S. Ct. at 2960 n.4. In its memorandum for the United States as ainicas
curiae in Chicago Bridge & Iron, the Solicitor General noted that a "number of foreign governments
have complained — both officially and unofficially — that the apportioned combined method ...
creates an irritant in their commercial relations with the United States." Memorandum for the
United States as Alnicus Curiae at 3, Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., appeal
dismissed 51 U.S.L.W. 3937 (U.S. October 10, 1983)), reprinted in 14 LAW REPRINTS (BNA) No. 9, 967,
973 (1981-82 term).
When a state seeks to levy a worldwide unitary tax on a foreign multinational the concern over
the threat of retaliation is far more serious. Javaras & Browne, Litigation Prospects After Container: The
Foreign Parent Issue, 20 TAX NOTES 1027, 1030 (Dec. 19, 1983). One commentator suggested that in
this case the technical argument that the legal incidence of the tax falls on the United States
subsidiary of a foreign parent would be far less persuasive. Id.
3.12 WhiteNack, supra note 305. at 780 (citing Container, 103 S. Ct. at 2956).
m et Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, State Taxation of :iaultinational Corpo-
rations, 18 TAX NOTES 995 (March 21, 1983) [hereinafter cited as ACTH Report].
Id. at 1002.
l'"
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activity abroad, rather than multiple taxation or tax discrimination. 346
 In the absence of
double taxation of Ibreign income or discriminatory treatment of foreign enterprises
operating in the United States, it was rather easy for the Court to dismiss foreign
retaliation as an unlikely and unwarranted response to the California tax.'"
The Container opinion leaves a significant gap in the delimitation of the unitary
business concept as applied to foreign based multinational firms,"" The issue of the
constitutionality of worldwide unitary taxation by a state of domestic corporations with
foreign parents, or foreign corporations with either foreign parents or foreign sub-
sidiaries will have to be brought before the Supreme Court again on a more appropriate
record. This issue has already been presented by several lower court cases in various
lederal courts."aa'
Besides adhering to constitutional precedents and doctrine, the Court in the OM-
Miner case took the appropriate political stance. 'lie combination of deference to the
states' division-of-income rules and deference to the federal government's authority to lay
uniform rules creates a powerful momentum toward a forthcoming, and badly needed,
compromise solution in the area of state income taxation of multijurisdictional corpora-
tions.
1 V. THE IMPACT OF THE Container DECISION
The effectiveness and equity of the unitary businessiformula apportionment ap-
proach depends on its widespread and uniform application by the states and, ultimately,
by the federal government and foreign nations. Although adoption by the latter is
"' Container, 103 S. CI. at 2956. The majority noted that "foreign nations have a legitimate
interest in reducing the tax burden of domestic corporations" and that "[they] may be ... offended
by what [they] consider unorthodox treatment of [Container Corpl."Id. These complaints, however,
do not rise to the level of legally cognizable rights of injuries, the Court held. Id. The dissenters
apparentely recognized this problem with the taxpayeCs argument when they admitted that even if
foreign governments have no grounds for complaining about the overall tax burden of an American
corporation, they have legitimate grounds to complain against the worldwide unitary tax because, "if
nothing else, such a tax has the effect of discouraging American investment in their countries," Id. at
2959 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also Javaras and Browne, supra note 341, at 1029-30.
347
 See Container, 103 S. Ct. at 2956. It must he kept in mind that the Court refused to engage in
fact finding and policy making on the issue of foreign retaliation. See id. at 2955. Instead the Court
chose to consider the issue in the abstract, based on the "imperatives of international trade and
international relations." Id.
"4"
 jaVaritS and Browne, supra note 341, at 1027; WhiteNack, supra note 305, at 780.
'4' See Shell Petroleum, N.V. v. Graves, 709 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Shell
Petroleum v. Franchetti, 51 U.S.L.W. 3440 (Dec. 6, 1983); Capitol Industries EMI, Inc. v. Bennett,
681 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1982), on remand sub now. EMI, Ltd. v. Bennett, 560 F. Stipp. 134 (N.D. Cal.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1189 (1983); Alcan Aluminium, Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Board, 558 F.
Supp. 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), affd, F.2d (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3309 (U.S.
January 10, 1984). Recent litigation on the foreign parent issue has dealt primarily with procedural
issues, in particular a foreign corporation's right to initiate an action challenging a unitary tax
directly in the federal courts. Javaras and Browne, supra note 341, at 1032. Such right has been
repeatedly denied. See cases cited supra. Foreign parents are typically barred from initiating an
action against state tax authorities in federal courts on grounds of standing and ripeness. Javaras and
Browne, .supra note 341, 1032-33. The few cases pending in state courts are all in the early stages at
the trial level. Whit eNack, supra note 305, at 782. Pending the Container case, both the states arid the
taxpayers were unwilling to go beyond the administrative level. Id.
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speculative, 3$' uniformity among the states has always been the underlying concern in all
of the Supreme Court's decisions in this area. 35 ' There is, hOwever, no uniformity among
the states today. 352
 This state of affairs creates difficulties for both the states and business-
es . 3" Uniform division-of-income rules would produce benefits for both the states and
businesses in the form of improved tax administration and reduced compliance bur-
dens .354
Both the taxing states and the taxpayers stand to lose from a continuation of the
present situation of nonuniformity. While some states may temporarily increase reve-
nues through aggressive division-of-income practices, such a practice will inevitably lead
to loss of foreign investment. The states may force each other into fiscal disaster through
complacent income taxation to attract foreign capital. Multijurisdictional corporations
may try to play off the differences in state tax laws to reduce their' taxes or to play shell
games with their income, but the benefits so generated would be outweighed in the long
run by the inefficiency of allocating resources solely on the basis of tax Minimization and
tax avoidance considerations. The federal govermnent may avoid a conflict with the
state's claim of unfettered sovereignty and a possible sacrifice of some of its own revenues
to offset lost state taxes. But it would become increasingly difficult for the federal
government to deal with foreign countries in order to protect United States businesses
abroad and foreign businesses in the United States. Conflicting interests will generate an
3" Presently no foreign nation adopts the unitary business/formula apportionment approach.
Consideration of the great difficulties encountered by the Internal Revenue Service in enforcing
section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 has lead to suggestions that the United States
federal government adopt the unitary approach. See GENERAL. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DicesT OF THE
REPORT '1'0 THE CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, IRS Could Better Protect
U.S. Tax Interests in Determining the Income of Multinational Corporations, reprinted in 13 TAN No ms 877
(October 19, 1981). No such action has yet been taken by the federal government.
35'
	 supra note 223 and accompanying text.
552
 GENERAL. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DIGEST OF THE REPORT' 'r0 THE CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS,.Key Issues Affecting State Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corporate
Income Need Resolving, reprinted in 16 TAx NoTEs 159 (July 12, 1982) [hereinafter cited as GAO
REPORT DIGEST, Key Noes). According to a recent GAO report, forty-five states (including the District
of Columbia) presently access taxes on the income of multi-jurisdictional — multistate and multina-
tional — corporations, using "a bewildering variety of rules." Id. Of the forty-five states that tax such
income, six do not have specific criteria for multi jurisdictional corporations, while the thirty-nine
others use one or more of sixteen different rules. Id. at 160. Thirty-four states use federal taxable
income as the starting point for determining state taxable income; the other eleven generally require
a corporation to start with gross income and deduct specific items. Id. Thirty-nine slates use an
equally weighed three-factor formula composed of property, payroll, and sales, but Four of these
states also can use alternative formulas which are differently composed and weighed. Id. The other
six states use different [M . :ludas, Id, States do not define uniformly the factors of property, payroll,
and sales. Id. Some states choose to allocate, instead of apportion, certain types of income in total to
individual states. Id. Eleven states allocate little or DO income; twenty - four allocate non - husiness
income: and ten states allocate income which they Classify in various ways. Id. Only thirteen states
currently adopt worldwide combined reporting, but a great majority of the large corporations with
foreign operations do business in states using this method. Id.
353 See generally GAO Report Digest, Key Issues, supra note 352, at 159. The present degree of
non-uniformity increases the risk of over- or undertaxation. Ultimately, a non-uniform and complex
tax system creates the risk of non-compliance and generates an unacceptable level of enforcement
costs, compliance but -dens, and uncertainity. Id.
3s'
	 Corrigan, Toward Uniformity in Interstate Taxation, 10 -Fax NOTES 507 (Sept. 15, 1980)
[hereinafter cited as Corrigan, Toward Uniformity]; Madill:, Toward Uniformity in Interstate Taxation:
A Further Analysis, 13 Tax NoTEs 51 . ( July 13, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Matire, Toward Uniformity].
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increasing amount of litigation, thereby wasting the courts' limited resources and produc-
ing a crazy quilt of weaving precedents.
There are two self-correcting forces operating within the existing network of dispa-
rate division-of-income rules used by the states: businesses' freedom to locate in states that
provide the most favorable tax climate and judicial scrutiny of unconstitutional state
practices. 355
 These self-correcting forces may be effective in preventing the present
system of nonuniform rules from generating excessive distortions in the taxation of
multijurisdictional entities. These forces, however, will never achieve tax efficiency and
equity, which require that neither more nor less than one hundred per cent of a mul-
tijurisdictional corporation's income he taxed overall, with each jurisdiction receiving a
share of tax revenues proportionate with the benefits and protection provided by it. This
optimal result can only he obtained through positive, nationally uniform rules, either-
through the states' voluntary cooperation or through congressional legislation.
Although the Supreme Court is aware of the need for uniformity and certainty in
division-of-income rules, it is unwilling to interfere with the political process and act
directly to achieve those goals. The Court has repeatedly stated that Congress and the
Executive Branch have the constitutional power and authority to deal with the interstate
and international commerce issues posed by state taxation of corporate income. 336 The
Court itself has steadfastly and appropriately refused to "assume the legislative mantle"
and dictate uniform rules for the states through its decisions. 3 " Nevertheless, the Court's
piecemeal provision of answers to issues raised in adversary proceedings between indi-
vidual taxpayers and individual states on a case-by-case basis is not a satisfactory way of
resolving the policy conflicts underlying unitary taxation!' Consequently, it seems very
unlikely that. the Court. would "try to pick apart" a negotiated solution at the federal. level
or a congressional statute achieving true uniformity in division-of-income practices
among the states."'"
The Court's attitude of judicial restraint in the Container case creates a propitious
climate for a political solution to division-of-income problems. By granting wide discre-
tion to the states in the taxation of multinational firms, the Container decision may inspire
congressional activity aimed at curbing the slates' freedom to adopt aggressive tax policies
in this area. 3 " The threat of federal legislation, however, evokes immediate and vigorous
ass ACII? Report, .supra note 343, at 1002. According to the ACIR Report, these self-correcting
forces make congressional action unnecessary. Id. Others disagree. See GAO REPowr DIGEST, Key
Issues, supra note 352, at 160; see also, Committee on Interstate Commerce of the New York State Bar
Association Tax Section, Congress and the Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corporations, 20 TAx NOTES 451
(Nov. 7, 1983) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. Bar Ass'n Report].
358 See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Corp. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 280 (1978); Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 445 U.S. 425, 449 (1980); see generally Corrigan, Toward
Uniformity, supra note 354, at 510.
351
 See McLure, Toward Uniformity, supra note 354, at 55.
3" See id.; GAO REpoRT DIGEST, Key Issues, supra note 352, at 160: N.Y. Bar Ass'n Report, supra
note 355, at 454. But see AC1R Report, .supra note 343, at 1001-02. II is important to note the time and
context in which the different comments were made. The perception of the Supreme Court's
attitude varied dramatically and repeatedly in the four-year period between 1978 and 1982 through
the sequence of cases analyzed supra at notes 101-187 and accompanying text.
ass
	 Toward Uniformity, supra note 354, at 510. See also McLure, Toward Uniformity, supra
note 354, at 55.
'6° The Supreme Court's decisions in ASARCO and Woolworth undermined ongoing efforts to
shape a congressional solution to state division
-or- income problems, while its decisions in Moorman,
Mobil, and Exxon provided a powerful stimulus for congressional involvement in these questions.
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opposition from the states."' TherelOre, the likelihood of independent congressional
action is at best remote, as is shown by the history of recurrent bills to restrict the states'
power to tax the income of multi jurisdictional corporations. 362 Legislation in this area by
Congress has long been paralyzed by a political stalemate with one group of congressmen
supporting multinationals and another group backing the states. To date, neither group
has sufficient votes to end this congressional standoff- 3 " The hope for uniform rules lies
entirely in a negotiated compromise among the states, the business community and the
federal government. The possibility of achieving such a compromise depends largely on
the Administration's determination to effect a strong conciliation.'t fi i
W. Hellerstein, Slate Income Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corporations, Part II: Reflections on ASARCO
and Woolworth, 81 Mien. L. R. 157, 190-91 (1982).
"` See ACIR Report, supra note 343, at 1000 & nn.26 & 27. The states oppose federal legislation
on a pragmatic level because of their concern about the revenue losses that would result if unitary
combination were limited to the "water's edge." Id. See generally Rosapepe & Goldberg, The Revenue
Effects of the Unitary Method: Two Responses to Shell's View, 21 TAX NOTES 147 (Jan. 9, 1984); Rosch &
Kennedy, State Revenues That Would Be Lost by Prohibiting Worldwide Unitary Taxation or the "Flaky Data"
Caper, 20 TAx Nana 1035 (Dec. 19, 1983). It has been questioned, however, whether revenue
considerations should play such a prominent role in the policy debate. McLure, Toward Uniformity,
supra note 354, at 55 n.21. In the words of Charles McLure, "One can, after all, think of many had
taxes that would raise substantial revenue!" Id. On a more doctrinal level, the states claim that federal
legislation would be an unconstitutional encroachment on their sovereignty. Dexter, State Taxation of
Multinationals: Are the Mathias and Conable Bills Constitutional?, 14 TAx Notts 715, 716-17 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Dexter, Mathias and Conable ACIR Report, supra note 343, at 1000. They
argue that the states should be free to select any particular method of tax they see fit, absent
overriding national commerce constraints. Id.
353 Since 1965, various bills have been introduced which would rest Ho the power of the states to
impose various taxes on multistate-multinational corporations. S. 1225, introduced by Senator
Charles C. Mathias, Jr., R-Md., and H.R. 2918 introduced by Ways and Means Committee member
Barber B. Conable, Jr., R-NY, would restrict the application of the unitary method in the case of
multinational corporations and would exempt foreign-source dividends from state taxation. In
particular, H.R. '1918 and its identical Senate counterpart S. 1225 would add a new section (§ 7518)
to the miscellaneous provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Subsection (a) would pre-
vent the states from applying "combined reporting", by forbidding them to take into account, in
determining the income tax liability of any corporation, the gross income of "foreign corporations"
unless that income is subject to federal income tax. The states would then have to resort to section
482 of the 1.R.C. Subsection (e) would restrict the states' power to levy corporate income taxes on
dividends received from foreign corporations or from domestic corporations whose income derives
largely from Foreign sources. For a detailed analysis of a predecessor of H.R. 2918, H.R. 5076,
identical in substance to H.R. 2918 and S. 1225, see W. Hellerstein. Stale Income Taxation of Multijuris-
dictional Corporations: Reflections on Mobil, Exxon, and H.R. 5076, 79 MICH. L. REV. 13, 154-71 (1980).
In sum, H.R. 2918 contains three different restrictions: (I) restrictions on the application of the
unitary concept tuforeign parents conducting operations in the United States through subsidiaries; (2)
restrictions on the application of the unitary concept todomestic parents conducting business in foreign
countries through subsidiaries; and (3) the exemption of foreign-source dividends. H.R. 2918 and S.
1225 have been severely criticized. W. Hellerstein, supra, at 170-71. It has even been questioned
whether such legislation is constitutional under the National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976), doctrine. Dexter, Mathias and Conable Bills, supra note 324, at 718.
363 J. Hellerstein, Allocation and Apportionment, supra note 184, at 168; WhiteNack, supra note
305, at 783.
'4 While the Administration refused to go on record against the worldwide unitary tax and
combined reporting, it is actively promoting the adoption of a compromise plan on the unitary
method. Treasury Secretary Donald 1'. Regan announced the formation of a working group to study
the unitary issue and to develop a federal policy on the unitary method. 20 TAx NOTES 70 (1983).
The working group includes representatives of the federal government, stale governments, and the
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V. Co •ct.usimx
After the series of Supreme Court decisions begining with Mobil and ending with
Container the constitut kmal parameters of unitary taxation are reasonably well drawn,
The Court may he expected in the near future to confront the issue of worldwide unitary
taxation by a state of foreign-based multinationals, which was left open in Container. The
Court, however, has clearly manifested its unwillingness to go beyond broad constitu-
tional doctrine in scrutinizing state practices and to immerse itself in the technical
intricacies and policy judgments involved in the fine-tuning of state division-of-income
rules. It is therefore up to the political process to forge normative solutions that will allow
a balanced network of state apportionment practices to operate efficiently and equitably.
The states must resist the temptation to be content with the power and discretion that the
Court has granted them. They must be willing to compromise some of their freedom for a
measure of uniformity and certainty. Orderly growth of interstate and international
commerce and efficient allocation of resources demand such a compromise. The equilib-
rium of the United Stales federal system and the viability of a community of nations
committed to free international trade also require it. The states, the business community
and the federal government have an interest and a duty to achieve a stable agreement in
the near future,
E'rroRE A. SA N"rUCCI
U.S. business community. For a complete list of the members, see 20 -FAX NOTES 525, 526-27 (1983). .
For a complete list of the group's staff see 20 TAX NOTES 627 (1983). The most pressing issue being 	 .
examined is state taxation of multinationals, rather than domestic multistate corporations. 20 TAX
NOTES 1011 (1983).
